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Department of Defense Directive 7640.2 (previously
5000.42), "Policy for the Followup of Contract Audit
Reports," has created controversy both within DoD and the
defense industry. Critics have claimed that the policy
causes a fundamental shift in the relationship between the
contracting officer and contract auditor, strengthening the
auditor*s role while eroding the independence and authority
of the contracting officer. The available literature on the
policy is highly subjective and consists primarily cf the
assertions of top management, both in government and
industry, either supporting or denouncing the policy.
The primary purpose of this study was to objectively
investigate the specific claims of critics and to explore
the overall impact of the followup policy on defense
procurement. The thesis is based on an analysis of data
collected from interviews of procurement managers,
contracting officers, and auditors within the state of
California and telephone discussions with procurement
professionals nationwide.
The results of the research indicate that the contract
audit followup policy: (1) adversely affects the indepen-
dent role of the contracting officer; (2) attracts unneces-
sary attention to the contracting officer/auditor
relationship; (3) imposes uneconomical goals on defense
procurement; and (4) fails to improve effective use of the
government's audit resources.
The results provide useful insight into the opinions and
feelings cf contracting practitioners and should assist
decision makers in testing their opinions and theories about
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I. INTRODUCTION
A. A CONTRACT AUDIT FOLLOIOP POLICY FOR DOD
In 1978 the General Accounting Office (GAO) reported
that fraud in the Federal Government amounted to $12 to $15
billion annually [Ref. 1:845-A24]. In February, 1981 f the
Congressional testimony of the Comptroller General recounted
the details of a January, 1981, GAO report that conserva-
tively estimated $25 billion in federal audit findings that
remained unresolved. * The report showed that nearly half of
those audit reports were issued by the Defense Contract
Audit Agency (DCAA) , which audits defense contractors
[Ref. 1:872-A2].
Under growing pressure to restore an image of integrity
and sound management to the procurement process, in August
of 1981, DoD officials issued the departments first formal-
ized policy for the followup of contract audit reports: DoD
Directive (DoDD) 5000. 42. 2 In December, 1982, the policy was
revised and reissued as DoDD 7640.2. 3
The new contract audit followup policy caused an imme-
diate uproar, both within the department and within the
defense industry. The sharpest criticism came from defense
contractors who claimed that there would be a fundamental
shift in the relationship between the contracting officer
and the contract auditor. Many peroeived that the change
would strengthen the auditor's influence in the contracting
process beyond the traditional role of financial adviser.
l A similar report in 1978 revealed approximately 54.
3
billion in unresolved audit findings.
2 DoD Directive 5000.42 appears in Appendix C.
3 DoD Directive 7640.2 appears in Appendix B.
8

Many viewed DoDD 5000.42 as eroding the independence of the
contracting officer in coordinating the professional counsel
of a team of advisers by over-emphasizing the advice of the
auditor. Their claim was that the contracting officer's
flexibility in negotiating contractual pricing arrangements
would be restricted, prolonging the negotiation process and
perhaps increasing the number of contractors' appeals to the
courts and tha Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals
(ASBCA) .
DoDD 5000.42 also received criticism from within DoD,
particularly among procurement managers and contracting
officers. The directive established a system for the
followup of contract audit reports requiring the intensive
oversight of management and comprehensive reporting to top
government officials. There were concerns regarding the
increasing commitment of resources to audit activities; an
indication that top government officials were perhaps
becoming less confident in DoD's ability to judiciously
manage its procurement system. Many procurement managers
were also troubled by the increased burden on administrative
resources imposed by the followup and reporting procedures.
That concern led one senior contracting manager to describe
the followup policy as "a Frankenstein monster out of
control!
"
Although lany procurement managers and contracting offi-
cers have privately expressed their opinions of the contract
audit followup policy, there is an understandable reluctance
to openly criticize official DoD policies. Therefore, the
purpose of this study was to explore the impact of the
followup policy from the practitioner's viewpoint; to inves-
tigate the claims of critics, and report the results.

B. BACKGROUND
Every department and agency in the Federal Government
has established procedures to ensure that public resources
are responsibly managed. However, with the advent of the
widely publicized "fight against fraud, waste, and abuse" in
public programs and operations, government officials have
stepped up their efforts in recent years.
In response to a Presidential msmorandum, the Office of
Management and Budget (OMB) , in March, 1978, issued Circular
A-73, "Audit of Federal Operations and Programs." Reports
on unresolved audit findings to Congress by the General
Accounting Office (GAO) created a 1st of legislative
activity linked to the problem of unresolved audit findings.
Congress passed the Inspector General Act of 1978 which
established the office of Inspector General in thirteen
federal agencies and departments. In 1981, Congress enacted
Public Law (PL) 96-304, which required: (1) the disposition
of all outstanding audit reports by 30 September 1981; and
(2) the resolution of all new audit reports within six
months of issuance. Congress also considered other measures
directly aimed at tightening the accountability of public
managers:
1. The Federal Manager 1 s Accountability Act of 1981.
2. The Financial Integrity Act of 1981.
3. The Debt Collection Act of 1981 [ Ref . 1:872-15].
In March of 1981, the President's Council on Integrity
and Efficiency was established. The council consisted of
all Inspectors General, and included other top officials of
the Department of Justice and the Federal Bureau of
Investigation. Those individuals were held personally
responsible for the followup of audit reports on federal
activities. DoD created a similar council to monitor the
followup of its audit reports.
10

It was in this environment of intensified management
attention to audit activities that DoD issued its first
policy for following up on contract audit reports: DoDD
5000.42. In September, 1982, OMB issued Circular A-50,
"Audit Followup." The Department of Defense incorporated
that new guidance into its contract audit followup pclicy by
issuing a revised directive, DoDD 7540.2 in December, 1982.
C. ASSUMPTIONS
The research report that follows assumes that the reader
is familiar with the the basic activities involved in DoD
procurement and the fundamental relationships which exist
among procurement managers, contracting officers, and
contract auditors. To assist the reader. Appendix A
contains key lefinitions related to contract audit followup




A. CONDUCT OF THE STUDY
Since DoD* s official policy for contract audit fcllowup
began with DoDD 5000.42 in August 198 1, there is a limited
amount of literature on the subject. That which is avail-
able is highly subjective and consists primarily of the
assertions cf top management, both in government and
industry, either supporting or denouncing the policy.
Defense contractors, speaking through industry associa-
tions, have been clamcring for an independent survey of
practitioners to determine the true effect of the policy on
the contracting process. The Naval Postgraduate School
submitted a proposal to the DoD Inspector General's office
to conduct that study but was underbid for the project by
the Defense Manpower Data Center (DSDC) . I was to partici-
pate in that study as a research assistant on the Naval
Postgraduate School's research team. When this opportunity
failed to materialize, I decided that a limited survey
conducted on a regional basis would still provide valuable
insight into the controversy. At the time of this writing,
the DMDC nationwide survey is underway. The results of the
DMDC study are expected to be released in June 1984.
Since DoDD 7640.2 directly affects contracting officers,
auditors, and management within both those communities, it
was necessary to collect information directly from them.
Because of the controversial nature of the directive, I
expected that those practitioners closest to the contract
audit process would be hesitant to undergo an interview
regarding their opinions. This was true in almost every
case. Potential interviewees seemed rather cautious and it
12

became apparent from the beginning that meaningful partici-
pation would depend on an assurance of complete anonymity.
B. THE SAMPLE
Research was limited to personal interviews conducted in
California (see Table I, p. 16) . In addition, there were
numerous telephone discussions with management officials in
various regional and national headquarters of the Military
Departments, Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) , and Defense
Contract Audit Agency (DCA&) . It was primarily through
those discussions that potential interviewees were identi-
fied. DoD Instruction 4105.59, Directory of Contract
Administration Services Components, also provided a list of
potentially valuable information sources. Budget and time
constraints dictated that interviews be conducted with as
many willing participants as possible within a 500 mile
radius cf the Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA.
Selections were not made randomly, nor was there an attempt
to establish a statistically valid sample. However, it is
the opinion of this researcher that the data provide an
accurate and useful insight into the opinions and feelings
of those responsible for carrying out the requirements of
DoD*s contract audit followup policy. I hope that this
thesis will assist decision makers in testing their opinions
and theories about the effects of the policy on defense
contracting.
I completed an extensive review of literature on the
subject of conducting interviews. This included studying
the psychological aspects of the interviewing process itself
in addition to the design and sequence of the questions to
be used. In recognizing the psychological implications of
dress, I decided it best to wear a ailitary uniform for
visits to contracting offices and a business suit for visits
13

to auditing offices. However, this approach was not
possible in every case, since most Plant Representative
Offices (PROs) have both contracting and audit personnel
assigned.
C. QUESTIONNAIRE DESIGN
I have approximately four years of experience in
contracting which proved extremely helpful in formulating
guestions for the interviews. Nevertheless, it was neces-
sary to closely study both the contracting and auditing
processes as a basis for questionnaire design.
The original questionnaire consisted of 54 questions,
nearly half of which were open-ended, or free-answer ques-
tions. A pre-test of the instrument and interview technique
was performed at several offices in the San Francisco Bay
area. The initial design of the questionnaire was used to
interview at least one individual of each group of respon-
dents (i.e. contracting officers, auditors, and management
of each) . I explained to those early participants that
their knowledge and experience would greatly influence the
subsequent design of separate instruments tailored to the
concerns, interests, and opinions of their respective
communities.
During the pre-test, respondents were encouraged to
pursue the discussion of particular aspects of the policy
which they felt were important. They were urged to express
their understanding of the policy in their own terminology.
They were asked to amplify answers to most of the IES/NO and
MULTIPLE CHOICE questions in order to test the propriety of
those type formats for those questions. Prefatory comments
were used to invite the repondent's special consideration to
those questions. I was concerned with promoting interaction




As a result of the pre- test, a number of improvements
were made:
1. Insight into the need to march interview style with
the anticipated personality/culture mix of the
groups,
2. The elimination of researcher bias linked to previous
contracting experience.
3. The incorporation of terminology more understandable
to practitioners.
4. The collection of information needed to develop sepa-
rate questionnaires for the different groups.
5. The nuiber of open-ended questions reduced to 13.
With the pre-test completed and adjustments made, the
remaining interviews were conducted primarily in Los Angeles
and Santa Clara County (Silicon Valley), California. Since
questionnaires were standardized and tailored to each group,
the researcher achieved considerable flexibility in
conducting interviews. The structure was very useful where
the interviewee s time was limited. Very little probing was
used, and most interviews took place in a relaxed atmosphere
of cooperation and interested discussion. Despite the
structured interview approach and small number of open-ended
questions, there were frequently lengthy discussions of many
issues.
All personal interviews were conducted within the state
of California. Table I lists the breakdown of participants
by military department or agency, job title, and grade
structure.
In all cases, managers were directly involved with DoDD
7640.2. All managers were responsible for ensuring the
timeliness and accuracy of reports and all contracting
managers particpa~e in the review process. Within the
Defense Logistics Agency and the Navy, managers were members
15

of Boards of Review. Managers at Air Force offices did not
perform any review function since the military commanders







Department/Agency Job Title Grade/Rank
























Defense Contract Audit Managemsnt/FAO GM-14







* DCAS' is a component of the Defenss Logisitics Agency.
GM/GS-14: 403 (12 Of 30)
GM/GS-13 (and 0-4): 37% (11 of 30
GS-12: 2355 (7 of 30)
JSots:
Management/ACO: Designates a manager of Administrative Contract-
ing Officers.
Management/PCO: Manager of Procuring Contracting Officers.
Mangement/PA: Manager of Price Analysts.
ACO: Administrative Contracting Officer.
PCO: Procuring Contracting Officer.
Manager/FAO: Manager of Field Audit Office.
Manager/RA: Manager of Resident Audit Office.
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III. PRESENTATION OF FINDINGS
A. EXPLANATION OF TABLES
This chapter provides the reader with an unedited pres-
entation of the findings of the stuiy. Although separate
questionnaires were used for the contracting and auditing
communities, the first 23 questions of both questionnaires
are identical.
Results are presented in tabular form listing the
percentage cf each group citing a particular response.
Column labels are defined as follows:
1. CONTR: The contracting group which includes both
contracting officers and contracting managers.
2. AUDIT: The audit group whicl includes auditors,
resident auditors, and audit managers.
3. BOTH: This column represents the percentage of
respondents from both groups citing a specific
response rather than an average of the two groups.
Many of the open-ended questions induced multiple
answers from some participants. However, some participants
didn't answer every question, either preferring not to
answer or feeling that they couldn't answer. Therefore,
percentages do not total 100% for each question.
B. TABLES OF FINDINGS
Table II presents data collected from those questions
which are the same en both questionnaires.
Table III presents the data collected from those ques-
tions which differed but were designed to seek the same
information from the two groups. In many cases, the differ-
ences in these groups required that questions be worded
differently or perhaps appear in different sequence.
18

Here the questions are brought together for ease of
reference and more meaningful analysis. An "A" precedes
auditor questions and a "C" designates contracting ques-
tions. Where questions were identical but used in different
sequence, the question is presented only once.
Table IV lists the data collected from those questions
asked of the contracting group only.
Table V provides the data collected from questions which




Results of Common Questions




5. In your own words , what do you believe are the major require-
ments of the directive, as you see them?
CONTR AUDIT BOTH
Resolution/disposition of audit reports 77% 25% 63%
Tracking of audit reports 55 13 43
Periodic status reports 50 37
Independent review of contractingof f icer 's
planned disposition 45 25 40
Timeliness of disposition —
»
41 38 40
Proper management attention and and action
on audit reports 23 25 23
Justification by contracting officer for
deviations from audit recommendations 14 13 13
System integrity; policinq 5 38 13
Improve audit report useage 5 25 10
Evaluation of audit follcwup system for
for compliance with directive 5 3
Note: This question was intended to have respondents list the
requirments they are actually experiencing rather than to
restate the directive itself. A prefatory comment was used that
asked, "What formal requirements does DoDu 7640.2 impose en you
and your organization that weren't officially required before?"
6. How has your job been affected by the requirements of this
directive?
CONTR AUDIT 30TH
Significant administrative impact 73% 88% 77%
Additional management time 36 88 50
No effect 23 13 20
Micr c-management/less control by local
management *• 18 13
Aggravates contracting officer/auditor
relationship 18 13
Significant potential effect— ««• »• 18 13
Slower negotiation process 5 3
Confusion about which audit recommendations
significant under 5000. 42 5 3
Note: Approximately 50% of all respondents commented that
the requirements of 7640.2 were much clearer than 5000. 42.
7. Are the objectives which DoD expects to achieve with this
directive clear to you?
CONTR AUDIT BOTH




8. In your own words, what do you believe is the purpose for DoD
issuing the directive?
CONTR AUDIT BOTH
Perceived need to restore integrity to the
system to reverse poor DoD image 45% 100% 60%
To ensure faster followup action on
overaged audit reports 41 30
Political pressure (Congress, GAO, DCkk\ 36 27
Better utilization of audit resources via
increased CO visibility 27 25 27
To give DCAA more clout 14 10
Note: Prefatory comments emphasized that this question was
intended to focus on one main objective, perhaps two at most.
9. Respondents were asked to rank the following six objectives
which have been stated in literature on the policy.
CONTR AUDIT
To encourage contracting officers to give
more heed to the advice of the auditor 23.4% 22.5%
To bring potentially troublesome situations
to the attention of management for faster
resolution 22.9 19.8
To require more Dersonal accountability for
the financially related decisions which a
contracting officer makes 18.9 15.9
To require more accountability for the
recommendations made in audit reports 17.0
To require more accountability of management
as it relates to the contracting process — 18.1 13.8
To enhance DoD ' s battle against fraud, waste,
and abuse in its procurement system 16.7 11.0
10. Do you feel that the directive will achieve these
objectives?
CONTR AUDII BOTH
Yes 45% 100% 60%
No 55 40
11. How do you think the goals of the directive are beneficial?
CONTR AUDIT BOTH
Improved CO/auditor coordination leading to
better problem visibility 27% 63% 37%
Management tool for contracting officers 36 13 30
Goals are admirable, but directive not
needed. Goals stated elsewhere 23 13 20
No benefit 23 17
Improve timeliness of decision-making 18 13 17
Potential cost savings ' 14 25 17
Increases CO accountability which produces
better supported decisions 38 10
Better supported DCAA reports 5 13 7
21

12. How do you think the goals of the directive are not
beneficial?
CONTR AUDIT BOTH
More administrative burden, bureaucratic
growth potential —• 32% 13% 27%
Can't see any negative effects 14 63 27
Adverse effect on Contracting Officer's
authority S business judgment 27 13 23
A system to second-guess the Contracting
Officer 27 20
More management time for questionable benefit
since reguirements already exist 14 13 13
Overemphasis on quick resolution 14 10
Negative effect on Contracting Officer/
Auditor relationship 5 13 7
13. Were any formal contract audit follow-up procedures used in
your organization prior to 7640.2?
CONTR AUDIT BOTH
Yes 36% 88% 50%
Nc 64 12 50
14. Prior to 7640.2, did you use sone personal method of
follcw-up for audit reports that contained unresolved
recommendations?
CONTR AUDIT BOTH
Yes 45% 13* 37%
No 18 13
15. In your opinion, were these procedures effective in
stressing the importance of audit recommendations?
CONTR AUDIT BOTH
Yes 59% 38% 53%
No 41 62 47
16. In your opinion, how has directive 7640.2 affected the
independent, decision-making authority of the contracting
officer?
CONT3 AUDIT BOTH
Weakened it 55% 25 47%
No effect 36 75 47
Strengthened it 9 6
22

17. Would you please explain your opinion including why you
believe such an impact is or is not important.
Weakened CONTR AUDIT BOTH
Contracting Officer must elevate significant
audit issues which encourages less rs-
SDonsibility for decisions 36? 25% 33%
Auditor's power overemphasized 27 20
Contracting Officer frustration from admin-
istrative harden. Less time for other
important tasks 5 3
45% 50% 47%
No effect
Contracting Officer has same contractual
authority, but less arbitrary
Contracting Officer still has the responsi-
bility for contractual decisions 14 50 23
Only impact is administrative 14 10
Significant actions have always been re-
viewed by senior acquisition official 5 3
Strengthened
Causes the Contracting Officer to more
carefully "think through" and document
decisions 9% 6%
18. In your opinion, how has the authority of the DCAA auditor
been affected by directive 7640.2?
co^I^ MRU BOTH
Strengthened auditor's role or influence
vis-a-vis the Contracting Officer 59%








19. Before the i sple mentation of 7640.2. what percentage of
audits in youf organization involved signiricant differences




20. What is now the percentage of audits containing these






21. In your opinion, when is the proper time to consider audit
recommendations as resolved?
CONTR AUDIT BOTH
After negotiations when the Contracting
Officer reaches agreement with the
contractor * 50% 50% 50%
When the Contracting Officer makes decision
either before or during negotiations 41 25 33
When contractor corrects deficiency or
implements audit recommendations 9 25 13
Varies according to type of audit 14 10
Whsn Auditor and Contracting Officer
settle differences 9 7
When DISAO or Review Hoard approves of the
Contracting Officer's position 5 13 7
22. As a result of the directive 7640.2, audit reports are
resolved:
30NTR AUDIT. BOTH
Much quicker 0% 13% 3%
Somewhat quicker- 23 38 27
No change 54 38 50
Somewhat slcwer 14 13 13
Much slower » 9


























Results of Comparable Questions
A 24. How many differences of opinion have you had elevated t<
C 25. an official or board in the last 6 months?
CONTR AUDIT
13 3
A 25. What percentage of senior official/board written recom-
mendations have been in agreement with or supported the
contracting officer's position?
C 26. What percentage of senior official/board written recom-
mendations have been in agreeient with the auditor?
CONTR AUDIT
Percentage in agreement with auditor 0%
Percentage in agreement with Contracting
Officer 100%
A 28. Prior to the advent of 7640. 2
f
when a contracting officer





C 31. Before 7640.2, when you disagreed with the auditor's





C 32. Do you now generally resolve such disagreements with the
auditor without going to a review official or board?
CONTR




A 29. Do you usually find it easy to establish good raDport
with most contracting officers?
AUDITMi —* — —
Yes 88%
Nc 12
C 33. Have you been able to establish good rapport with m





A 30. What changes if any have you noticed in the attitudes of
contracting officers that could be linked to the imple-
mentation of this directive?
AUDIT
Contracting Officers more willing to discuss
positions with DCAA 63?
No change in attitude 25
Contracting Officers more adversarial 25
Contracting Officers dislike the directive 12
C 34. What changes if any have you noticed in the attitudes of
auditors that could be linked to the implementation of
this directive?
CONTR
No change in attitude 72%
Auditors less hesitant to ensure Contracting
Officers comply with directive; more probing 9
Auditors concerned that policy causes more rifts
between them and Contracting Officers 9
Auditors more concerned that audit is defensible -- 9
A 34. What differences, if any, have you noticed in
C 39. contractors 1 proposals as a result of directive 7640.2?
CONTR iUDIT
No change 100% 100%
26

A 35. Before the implementation of 7643.2, how often were you
asked to settle a disagreement directly with a contractor?
C 43. Before the implementation of 7640.2, how often did you
ask a contractor to settle a disagreement directly with
an auditor?
CONTR &UDI1 BOTH
Occasionally 25% 63% 36%
Never 45 30
Rarely 25 25 25
Frequently 5 12 7
Always
A 36. In your opinion, when is it advisable for an auditor and
the contractor to deal directly in seeking to settle dis-
agreements on audit recommendations?
AUDIT
When there are questions of fact, i, e. accounting
system (& other system) deficiencies, incurred
costs, defective pricing, etc 100*
C 45. Do you think it*s good to ask a contractor to settle audit




A 37. How has the i nplement ation of directive 7640.2 changed the
type of costs which an auditor would question?
C 46. How has directive 7640.2 changed the type of costs
questioned by auditors?
CONTR M2I£
No changes 100% 100%
A 38. In your organization, has tnere been any documented re-







A 39. To your knowledge, has 7640.2 had any affect on the per-
centage of disputes which hava been appealed to the ASBCA
cr courts?
C 50. Is thera any evidence that 7640.2 is affecting the fre-




A 40. What would you recommend?
C 52.
CONTR AUDIT BOTH









Results of Contracting Officer Questions
C 24. Which of the following does your organization use for
management review of differences of opinion?
CONTR
Senior officials only 33%
Boards only 29
Both of these 38
C 27. How has the directive affected the way you negotiate?
CONTR
No effect * 50%
Less effective negotiations from divided Government
position which contractor can exploit 27
Less effective negotiations due to less time for
planning and delays 23
C 28. What percentage of major negotiations in which you have
participated also included tha auditor as a participant?
CONTR
Resoondents who said 100% 50%
Respondents who said 10 - 5% 18
Respondents who said none 18
Respondents who said 70 - 3 0% 14





C 30. What is your opinion about auditors particioating in
negotiations with a contractor?
CONTR
A good idea only if auditor realizes that the
Contracting Orficer is the team leader 41%
Auditors participation is generally halpful 36
Auditor's participation is of some value depending
on the situation 23
Auditor's participation is absolutaly essential
due to tactical importance as financial expert — 18
29







C 36. What key things do you
audit report is good?
look for in deciding whether an
CONTR
Quality of documentation and support of findings 67%
Responsiveness to audit request and sufficient depth
of review to facilitate negotiations 23
Reputation of auditor or DCAA office 14
Topic of report 9
Assume every audit report is good 9
Timeliness 5
C 37. How would
reports?







C 38. Do you believe that the overall quality of DCAA audit






C 40. When you disagree with an


















41. When you disagree with the opinion of a review board or








C 42. How often do you feel compelled to avoid potentially con-








C 44. Since the implementation of 7640. 2 f how often have you







C 47. Have you experienced any delay in procurement as a direct




C 48. Do you believe that the overall effect of this delay has






51. Have you experienced any new difficulty in the negotiation






Results of Auditor Questions
A 26. How often have you participatsd in negotiations with













A 32. What key things determine whether an audit report is
effective?
AUDIT
The extent to which recommendations are sustained
in the negotiations 75%
Must be complately accurate and sufficiently
detailed 63
Must be useful to the negot iatior , i. e. understand-
able- supportable, flexible 50
Adequate tmeliness tc permit consideration of
findings *• 13
A 33. In your ODinion, has 7640.2 improved the effectiveness of
audit reports?
AUDIT





IV. IMPLEMENTATION OF DIRECTIVE
A. MAJOR REQUIREMENTS
Department of Defense Directive 7640.2 states
Contracting officers ani acquisition aanagement offi-
cials shall pursue timely resolution and disposition of
contract audit reports. Resolution of contract audit
reports by law is required within 6 months of issuance,
ana disposition normally shall be completed within 6
months. The contract audit followup system shall be
structured in consonance with the independent decision-
making role of the contracting officer and the financial
advisory role of the contract auditor [Ref. 2],
In attempting to achieve the timely resolution and disposi-
tion of audit reports, both DoDD 7640.2 and its predecessor,
DoDD 5000.42 set forth essentially the same major
requirements:
1. Tracking by the contracting officer of all contract
audit reports.
2. Status reporting of specified contract audit reports
to DoD's Inspector General.
3. Senior management review of differences between
contracting officers and auditors.
4. Evaluation of effectiveness of the foilowup system
employed by each DcD component.
Question 5 of Table VI was intended to explore the
possibility of any emergent requirement not officially
stated in the directive by focusing on the practitioner's
perspective of that issue. However, Table VI shows that
most participants were comfortable with simply repeating the
officially stated requirements of the directive, i.e., the
tracking, reporting, and timely resolution of audit reports,





5. In ycur own words, what do you believe are the major
requirements of the directive, as you see them?
CONTR AUDIT BOTH
a. Resolution/disposition of audit
reports 77% 25% 6355
b. Tracking of audit reports 55 13 43
c. Periodic status reports 50 37
d. Independent review of contracting
officer 1 s planned dispostion 45 25 40
e. Timelinsss of disposition 41 38 40
f. Proper management attention aad
action on audit reports 23 25 23
g. Justification by contracting
officer for deviations from
audit recommendations 14 13 13
h- System integrity; policing 5 38 13
i. Improve audit report useage 5 25 10
j. Evaluation of audit followup system
for compliance with directive 5 3
i
by senior acguistion officials. No additional requirement
appears in the responses. But 63% of the auditors and 10%
of the contracting group took this aarly opportunity in the
interview to express what they beliaved were some of the
objectives of the followup policy, as indicated by responses
(h) and (i) of Table VI.
B. FOLLOWOP PRIOR TO DODD 7640.2
The questions in Table VII were intended to ascertain
whether there were any procedures for following up on
contract audit reports prior to 7643.2 (other than 5000.42).
Responses to question 13 indicate that there were some
formal procedures for contract audit followup in existence
prior to DoDD 7640.2. In addition, as the responses to




Followup Procedures Prior to 7640.2
13. Were any formal contract audit followup procedures
used in your organization prior to 7640.2?
CONTR AUDIT BOTH
Yes 36% 88% 50%
No 64 12 50
14. Prior to 7640.2, did you use some personal method
of fcllowup fcr audit reports that contained
unresolved recommendations?
CONTR AODI! SQ1I
Yes 45% 13% 37%
No 18 13
15. In your opinicn, ware these procedures effective
in stressing the importance of audit recommendations?
CONTR AUDIT BOTH
Yes 59% 38% 53%
No 41 62 47
some personal method of followup. The contracting group
referred to reports used to track the status of specified
audit reports such as defective prising audits, overhead
audits, and Cost Accounting Standards (CAS) compliance
audits. Auditors referred to DCAA's Contract Audit Manual
(CAM) , which provides auditors with guidance for pursuing
the status cf audit reports. Howevsr, auditors were quick
to point out that the CAM provides aothing which will ensure
than contracting officers give auditors the feedback that
they desire. Question 15 frequently met with long pauses
and appeared to be a difficult answer for most participants,
particularly the contracting group. Many of those answering
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"yes" believed that the existing procedures were only
successful to some extent. Auditors who answered "no"
emphasized that feedback from contracting officers, if
received at all, was usually late and came after repeated
attempts to acquire such information.
C. JOB IBPACT
Table VIII shows that the greatest impact on the partic-
ipants 1 jobs has been an increase in administrative
TABLE VIII
Job Impact
6. How has your job been affected by the requirements
of this directive?
CONTB AUDIT BOTH
a. Significant administrative impact 73% 88% 77%
b. Additional management time 36 88 50
c. No effect 23 13 20
d. Micro-management/less control by
local management-* 18 13
e. Aggravates relationship between
contracting officer and auditor -- 18 13
f. Significant potential effect 18 13
g. Slower negotiation process 5 3
n. Confusion about which audit recom-
mendations significant under
DoDD 5000. U2 5 3
requirements. Most of the offices visited complained that
administrative resources were strained before DoDD 7640.2
and felt that the additional administrative burden of the
directive has enlarged the problem. Three respondents of
the audit group felt that DCAA's reporting requirements were
duplicative and unnecessary. Half of the respondents are




The current Presidential administration has espoused a
general policy of less paperwork in government. Executive
Order 12352 of March 17, 19 82, addressed the reduction of
administrates costs in the procurement system by charging
the heads of executive agencies with the responsibility to:
Establish programs to reduce administrative costs and
other burdens which the procurement function imposes on
the Federal Government and the private sector. Each
program shall take into account tae need to eliminate
unnecessary agency procurement, regulations, paperwork,
reporting requirements.. . .and othsr administrative
procedures. [ Ref . 4]
Congress demonstrated a similar intent by passing into law
such measures as the Paperwork Reduction Act. Nevertheless,
several interviewees believed that DoD's contract audit
followup policy had a good chance to be expanded. One Navy
manager pointed out that when the policy first appeared as
DoDD 5000.42, the tracking and reporting requirements
applied only to certain specified audit reports that
contained significant differences between the contracting
officer and the contract auditor. DoDD 7640.2 now requires
the tracking of all audit reports, but has eliminated the
reporting requirement for certain types of audit reports, a
revision that DoD has predicted will reduce the administra-
tive burden of the fcllowup procedures.
Although DoDD 7640.2 requires that only certain
outstanding audit recommendations be reported, there was a
sense of apprehension among many practitioners that this
requirement might be expanded. The Air Force seems to be
preparing for this possibility by developing a computerized
system to handle the tracking and reporting requirements.
The system will be called the Contracting Officer*
s
Information Network (COIN) and is expected to ease the
administrative burden of the contracting officer.
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Sixty-four percent of the contracting group (responses d
through h of Table VIII) pointed out additional effects of
the directive on their jobs. Several expressed regret that
the auditor/contracting officer relationship has been
adversely affected. One ACO put it this way: "The policy
can't change human nature, although it may affect it some.
Where the relationship is good thers should seldom be disa-
greement. However, where there is little or no communica-
tion, or where the communication is ineffective, there is
much room for disagreement. " It is interesting to note that
ths relationship between the contracting officer and the
auditor has been a source of concern for many within DoD
since the Defense Contract Audit Agency was formed in 1965
[Ref. 5].
The involvement cf management in the details of
following up on audit reports was also disturbing to 18?? of
the contracting group. They considered it to be a clear
signal from top government officials that they lacked confi-
dence in the contracting work force. An Air Force Principal
Administrative Contracting Officer (PACO) explained his
feelings. "There is a perceived need for contracting offi-
cers to give more heed to audit advice. If I decide not to
use the auditor's advice, I have to justify my decision to
the DISAO."
D. EBOTIOHAL ASPECTS
Controversial issues generally provoke emotion, and DoDD
7640. 2 is no exception. The responses listed in Table IX
demonstrate this fact. When asked if their organizations
had implemented the directive, two respondents (9%) of the
contracting group answered "no" despite the fact that imple-
mentation has taken place in their organizations. Their










discussions made this quite clear. Although they would not
clarify their answers, they were obviously making an
emotional statement that they did not see the need for the
directive. If left to them, the directive would not have
been issued.
Table X brings more focus to the question of whether
practitioners feel a need for the contract audit followup
TABLE X
Do le Need DoDD 7640.2?
A 40. (J hat would you recommend?
C 52.
CONTR AUDI! BOTH
Cancel the directive 54% 12% 43%
Make no changes 14 88 34
Change the directive 32 23
policy. SeveQ of the audit participants (88%) felt that the
directive is needed and believed that the directive will
clearly demonstrate its value in the next two years.
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Auditors generally agreed that the increase in administra-
tive requirements were worth the price, predicting that the
benefits of the policy will far outweigh its costs.
Only three of the contracting group (14%) share the
auditors 1 optimism. The majority opinion is best described
by the following response from a DCAS manager:
The directive doesn't meet the cost/benefit acid test.
The costs far outweigh the benefits, if indeed there are
any benefits. The theory of avoiding delay in settling
tough pricing issues is sound. It's the way of doing
business for every conscientous contracting officer I
know. One of the key issues is that the competency
level of the procurement work force doesn't change
because of the policy. There may be an argument for the
policy's influence on the pre-nego tiaticn position being
improved, since management* is called in for advice and
recommendations. However, this applies only to DCAS
since the services already have formalized policy on
developing pr e-negotiation positions with the aid of• -neg<
management. Not oily does the poii<
what it presumes to achieve, but it
the inadequacy of the work force in dealing with tough
decisions.
d licy fail to achieve
calls attention to
Most of the contracting group believed that DoDD 7640.2
instituted a system of micr o-managenent, i.e., top manage-
ment involving itself in management details which properly
belong to middle managers. Those favoring a change in the
directive also were most concerned about the micro-
management implications. Although in agreement with the
need to reduce the number and incidence of overaged audit
reports, they were not in agreement with the directive's
procedures aimed at achieving that goal.
41

• POLICY OBJECTIVES AND RESULTS
A. OBJECTIVES
Table XI represents the views of participants with
regard to the objectives of DoDD 7640.2 and the extent to
which these objectives might be achieved. Question 7 indi-
cates that 83% of all respondents believed that the direc-
tive's objectives were clear. However, it is interesting to
contrast the responses to question 8 with those of question
9. That difference suggests that a clear statement of
policy objectives has yet to be fully comnuni cared to prac-
titioners. Question 8 asks for policy objectives in the
words of the respondent, while question 9 asks the respon-
dent to rank objectives which have been identified by
Government officials in the literature on DoDD 7640.2.
Question 8 shows that 6 0% of all respondents believed
that DoD*s procurement system is suffering from an image of
questionable integrity. There was mention of the "horror
stories" and bad press that have brought increasing criti-
cism and political pressure to bear on DoD policy makers.
One contracting manager claimed that he attended a speech
given by former Assistant Deputy Under Secretary of Defense
(Acquisition Policy) Robert Trimble in which Mr. Trimble
said that DoDD 5000.42 was issued to please Congressman
Brooks (D-Texas) . According to this respondent, Mr. Trimble
implied that the directive was hastily put together at the
last minute, receiving very little coordination below top
management level. This view tends to support the opinion of
many of the respondents that DoDD 7640.2 is a significant
improvement over DoDD 5000.42 in terms of clarity. One








Participants 1 Views on Objectives
7. Are the objectives which DoD expects to achieve with
this directive clear to you?
CONTR AUDIT BOTH
Yes 77% 1033 83%
No 23 17
8. In your own words, what do you believe is the pur-
pose for DoD issuing the directive?
CONTR AUDIT BOTH
a. Perceived need to restore
integrity to the system to
reverse poor DcD image 45% 100% 60%
b. To ensure faster followup action
on overaged audit reports 4 1
c. Political pressure (Congress,
GAO. DCAA) 36
d. Better utilization of audit re-
sources via increased contracting
officer visibility 27
e. To give DCAA more clout 14
9. Respondents were asked to rack the following six
objectives which have been stated in literature
on the policy.
CONTR AUDIT
a. To encourage contracting officers to
give more heed to the advice of the
auditor 23.4% 22.5%
b. To bring potentially troublesome
situations to the attention of
management for faster resolution 22.9 19.8
c. To require more personal accountability
for the financially related decisions
which a contracting officer makes 18.9 15.9
d. To require more accountability for the
recommendations made in audit reports - 17.0
e. To require more accountability or
management as it relates to the
contracting process 18.1 13.8
f. To enhance DoD^ battle against fraud,
waste, and abuse in its procurement
system 16.7 11.0
10. Do you feel that the directive will achieve these
objectives?
CONTR AUDIT BOTH




I think 7640.2 is a great improvement over 5000.42 which
was so hastily thrown together that it created a lot of
consternation within the contracting community. Perhaps
if 5000. 42 had not been issued first, 7640.2 would be
received a lot better.
A substantial number (4 1%) of the contracting group
believed that faster followup action was a primary aim of
the policy (response 8-b) . The timsliness issue was a
common thread that ran throughout the course of most inter-
views. The concern for timeliness is apparently due to the
provision which Congress included in its passage of P.L.
96-304 reguiring resolution of all federal audit reports
within 6 months of issue.
Thirty-six percent of the contracting group recognized
that, in order to improve its credibility with Congress, DoD
needs to respond to the political pressure for improvement
in specific areas. One contracting officer said that "DoD
needs to dispose of a large number of outstanding audit
reports to give Congress the impression that we have done
something to control costs. This would certainly help to
mitigate the negative implications of reports made to
Congress by the General Accounting Office." 4
Perhaps the most interesting result of guestion 9 was
the tendency of both groups to give a lower ranking to the
accountability of practitioners. These responses appear to
be a psychological way of dealing with the perception that
more accountability is expected froa them. That interpreta-
tion of the responses becomes even more probable when
considering that management's involvement was thought to be
important (response 9-b) , but not management's account-
ability (response 9-e) . The apparent paradox may be the
result of the confusion between the requirements of DoDD
7640.2 and its predecessor, DoDD 5000.42. One of the




provisions of DoDD 5000. 42 required senior acquisition
management (DISAO) to take a "clear position" on disagree-
ments and issue a written statement of such position to the
contracting officer. DoDD 7640.2 has somewhat softened its
language in this area so that the DISAO acts more as an
adviser than a decision maker. Howsver, the role of the
DISAO still seems unclear.
The emphasis on timeliness of resolution was expected
and is comparable to the similar emphasis found in response
to question 8. It is surprising that response 9(f) was not
rated higher since "enhancing DoD's battle against fraud,
waste, and abuse" is a popular phrase found in the literal
ture on audit followup.
Question 10 contrasts the cohesiveness of the auditing
group with the split in the contracting group. All of those
answering "no 1* made it clear that some of the objectives
might be acheived, but not all of them. The 60% answering
"yes" failed to make this distinctiDn, which appears unreal-
istic. Of those who qualified their "yes" answers, there
was a general belief that all objectives would be achieved
to a certain extent, some more than others. One auditing
manager did say that achieving all of the policy's objec-
tives would depend on how well DoD's Inspector General
(DoDIG) enforces compliance with the directive. The DoDIG
followup to ensure compliance is one of the major stated
requirements of DoDD 7640.2.
Those less confident in the directive's ability to
achieve its objectives were more outspoken. One Defense
Contracts Administration Service (D3AS) ACO expressed this
opinion:
The competent contracting officer has alwavs given
appropriate attention to audit, and in those cases where
he disagrees, has dene so for good, sound reasons. The
directive can't improve this. For the less competent
contractina officer, the directive still doesn't change
anything since he always has relied heavily on audit
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advice and will continue to do so rather than challenge
audit recommendations.
Another DCAS Manager/ACO had this to say:
Contracting officers have always given heed to the
auditor. They have always been personally accountable
for their decisions, and management has always been
accountable to a certain extent for their decisions.
This won't change either. All of this is political
nonsense.
B. RESULTS
1 . Resolving Si gni ficant Differences
Table XII indicates that DoDD 7640. 2 has had no
appreciable effect on the number of significant differences
between contracting officers and auditors. However, there
may still be some confusion among practitioners with respect
to what constitutes a "significant difference" since 7640,2
revised the definition. Regardless of the definition, it is
apparent that the majority of contracting officers dispose
of audit reports by agreeing with the major findings of
auditors. Auditors most frequently responded to questions
19 and 20 by saying that no statistics are available on the
issue. However, in the words of on= audit manager, "DCAA on
the whole has experienced a 65% sustention rate on its
recommendations. This means that 55% of the auditor's
recommendations have been incorporated into the contract."
Since the "give and take" of contract negotiations usually
require a pre- negotiation position aigher than the desired
settlement, the 65% sustention experience of DCAA suggests
that contracting officers have generally entered into nego-
tiations with a percentage of agreement with audit advice





19. Before the implementation of 7640.2, what percent-
age of audits in your organization involved signif-
icant differences of opinion between the contract-
ing officer and the contract: auditor?
CONTR AUJ2II
Insignificant/quite small 100% *
20. What is now the percentage of audits containing
these differences of opinion between contracting
officer and contract auditor?
CONTR AUDIT
Insignificant/quite small 100^ *
* No statistics available
favorably with the contracting group's responses to ques-
tions 1 9 and 20.
2. Speed of Resolution
Table XIII indicates that the majority of respon-
dents (50%) believed that DoDD 7640.2 has had no effect on
the speed of resolution. Many respondants felt that the
policy was too n aw to determine its true effect in this
area. One auditor said that quicker resolution of differ-
ences of opinion will occur only if the policy is followed.
Thsre were no respondents who disagreed with the principal
goal of reducing the number of overaged audit reports.
However, a significant number of ths contracting group
pointed cut that quicker resolution of differences between
the contracting officer and auditor does not always result




Change in Speed of Resolution










54 3 3 50
14 13 13
9
Additionally, it was pointed out that quicker disposition of
audit reports does not always serve the government's best
interests, an issue which is discussed later.
3- Independent Reviews
Table XIV indicates a total of 16 audit actions
elevated to a DISAO or Board for independent review. This
figure may be slightly overstated since it is possible that
references to elevated actions coming from the different
groups pertain to the same audit report. The most striking
feature of Table XIV is that all of the reviews have been
decided in favor of the contracting officer's position.
Several of the auditors questioned whether the
so-called "independent" management review of the contracting
officer* s position really achieves a completely impartial
assessment of the differences in opinion between the auditor
and contracting officer. Their suspicion may be warranted
in view of the fact that 100% of the elevated actions
reported have gone in favor of the oontracting officer.
Several contracting officers commented on the tendency of
senior management to approve the contracting officer's posi-





A 24. How many differences of opinion have you had
C 25. elevated tc an official or ooard in the last
6 mo n t hs ?
CONTR AUDIT
13 3
A 25. What percentage of senior official/board written
recommendations have been in aaraement with or
supported the contracting officer's position?
C 26. What percentage of senior official/board written
recommendations have been in agreement with the
auditor?
CONTR AUDIT
Percentaae in agreement with auditor 0%
Percentage in agreement with Contracting
Officer • 100%
i
1. Management's lack of experience with the contracting
system (primarily cited for military officers)
.
2. Management's unfamiliarity with the specific procure-
ment action in question.
3. The need for expediency, i.e., avoiding delays and
complications in the organization's procurement
mission
.
4. The advice of ether technical experts favored the
contracting officer over the auditor.
However, it should be noted that the directive offers the
auditor an avenue of recourse:
The Director, Defense Contract Audit Agency (DCAA)
shall. .. monitor ail final disposition and negotiation
memoranda received. When the memoranda indicate that a
pattern of substantial differences of opinion exists on
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the disposition, of conttract audit reports, whether the
contracting officer did or did not request reviews by
the DISAO, the contract audit field office auditor shall
refer the matter to the cognizant DCAA regional director
[Ref. 2: F-7.b.].
4 . Direct Effect on Contractors
The data in Table XV indicate that there are no
effects from DoDD 7640.2 directly traceable to defense
contractors. One Air Force contracting manager believed
that most contractors are not aware of the directive's
requirements. However, one respondent in the audit group
indicated that contractors seem to be responding a little
more quickly to audit reports than in the past. In view of
the stand taken against the policy by two major industry
associations, 5 it would be misleading to say that contrac-
tors aren't aware of the directive.
The responses to questions A39 and C50 are
surprising in view of the predictions that were made when
the policy was first introduced as DoDD 5000.42 in August of
1981. Because of the previsions of the Contract Disputes
Act of 1978, 6 there were many who expected a substantial
increase in the litigation of contractual disputes. Since
the audit followup policy was expected to cause contracting
officers to issue more final decisions in agreement with the
auditor, it was believed what more appeals would result.
However, the data show that this has yet to be a problem.
Another interesting aspect to these responses is that no cne
interviewed mentioned that there was potential for increased
litigation, despite its being a reasonable expectation.
Na
s The Electronic Industries Association (EIA) and Th
tional Security Industrial Association (NSIA)
6 The Disputes Act provides government contractors with





Direct Effects on Contractors
A 34. What differences, if any, have you noticed in
C 39. contractors 1 proposals as a result of 7640.2?
CONTR AUDIT
No change 100% 100%
A 37. How has the implementation of directive 7640.2
changed t'
question?
he type of cos us which an auditor would
ii
C 46. How has directive 7640.2 changed the type of costs
questioned by auditors?
CONTR AUDIT
No changes 100% 130%
A 39. To your knowledge, has 7640.2 had any effect on
the percentaae of disputes which have been
appealed to the AS BCA or courts?
C 50. Is there any evidence that 7640.2 is affectin





5- Contractor- Audit or Disa.gr eement s
The questions appearing in Table XVI were intended
to test the effect of DoDD 7640.2 oq the frequency and
proprie-y of direct settlements of disagreements between
contractors and auditors. Because of an oversight, auditors
were not asked a followup question to A35.
The responses to questions A36 and C45 show that





A 35. Before the iirpleme ntation of 7640.2, hew often
were you asked to settle a disagreement directly
with a contractor?
C 43. Before the inpleme ntation of 7640.2, how often
did you ask a contractor to settle a disagreement
directly with an auditor?
CONTR AUDIT, BOTH
Occasionally 25% 63 36%
Never 45 30
Rarely 25 25 25
Frequently 5 12 7
Always
C 44. Since the implemsn ration of 7640.2, how often








36. In your opinion, when is it advisable for an
auditor and the contractor to deal directly in
seeking to settle disagreeaents on audit
recommend at ions?
AUDI '
When there are questions of fact, i.e. accounting
system (S other system) deficiencies, incurred
costs, defective pricing, etc 100%
C 45. Do you think it's good to ask a contractor to







directly between the auditor and contractor. Comments from
the contracting respondents answering "yes" to question C45
are in agreement with the auditing group's response to ques-
tion A36. As one Navy PCO put it:
Where there are issues of fact to be settled, these
should be dealt with prior -co negotiations. If they
(auditor and contractor) can settle, it avoids beina an
issue. To say "no" would imply that the contracting
officer is always capable of achiaving a superior deci-
sion.
The percentage of those contracting respondents who
never ask for direct settlement rosa from 45£ (question C43)
to 63% (question C44) after the implementation of DoDD
7640.2. There are times when direct settlements between
auditor and contractor are appropriate, as the response to
question A36 indicates. But thare is no apparent explana-
tion for the number of requests for direct settlements to
decrease. Perhaps the responses to questions C44 and C45
are a reflection of the contracting officer's frustration or
disappointment in the ascension of the auditor's role.
6 • Qualit y and Effect iveness of Audit Reports
As Table XVII indicates, the overwhelming majority
of respondents believed that the directive had no effect on
the quality of DCAA audit reports. The auditors who
answered "yes" to question A31 gava qualified answers. They
stressed the need for audit reports to be of unquestionable
integrity and accuracy due to the potential for disagree-
ments with contracting officers. However, they were quick
to add that an unqualified "yes" would suggest that DCAA
audit reports have not always been of the highest quality.
Question A32 (response a) of Table XVIII highlights
the importance that 75% of the auditors attached to the




Effect on Quality of Audit Reports
A 31. In your view, has this dirsctive affected the













C 38. Do you believe that the overall quality of DCAA




this end, 50% of the auditors stressed the utility cf audit
reports, including accuracy and flexibility as essential
characteristics that make an audit report useful in negoti-
ating a fair and reasonable price. In comparison, a rela-
tively small number (23%) of the contracting group cited the
usefulness cf audit reports in negotiations (C36, response
b) as a criterion for deciding the value of an audit report.
However, 67% named (1) the quality of documentation, and (2)
the support for findings, both of which are fundamental
requirements for successful negotiation.
The issue of timeliness seeus to command consider-




Audit Report Ef fectiveness
A 32. What key things determine whether an audit report
is effective?
AUDIT
a. The extent to which recommendations are
sustained in the negotiations 75%
b. Must be completely accurate and sufficiently
detailed 63
c. Must be useful to the negotiatior, i. e. under-
standable, supportable, flexible 50
d. Adeguats timeliness to permit consideration
of findings 13
A 33. In your opinion, has 7640.2 improved the effect-
iveness of audit reports?
AUDI!
Too soon to tell 50%
Yes 38
No 12





C 36. What key things do you look for in deciding
whether an audit report is good?
CONTR
a. Quality of documentation and support
of findings 67%
b. Responsiveness to audit request and sufficient
depth of review to facilitate negotiations 23
c. Reputation of auditor or DCAA ofrice 14
d. Topic of report 9
e. Assume every audit report is good 9
f. Timeliness 5
contract audit. In literature and correspondence on the
topic, the predominant view seems to be that audit reports
55

must be timely to be effective. However, it is interesting
to find that both groups considered the timeliness of an
audit report to be relatively insignificant in determining
its effectiveness. Better than 80^ of the contracting group
were satisfied with the guality of DCAA audit reports (Table
XVII) , which would suggest that they ware similarly satis-
fied with the timeliness with which they receive the
reports. This issue should not be confused with that of the
timeliness of resolution between auditors and contracting
officers.
There was a marked difference of opinion regarding
the influence of DoDD 7640.2 on the effectiveness of audit
reports. While 38% of the auditors believed that the direc-
tive has improved audit report effectiveness, only 9% of the
contracting group reported that the directive had increased
their use of audit reports. Auditors appeared optimistic
about this issue since 50S of those surveyed said that it
was too soon to tell whether there will be an impact on
ef f activeness. Although the consensus among auditors was
that audit effectiveness will increase as time passes, thsre
was no evidence that this has yet taken place.
C. BENEFITS AND DETRIMENTS
Table XIX illustrates that DoDD 7640.2, to this point,
has caused only minor procurement delays. However, of the
three contracting officers (14%) answering "yes" to guestion
C47, two believed that the Government failed to benefit from
the delay. Despite this seemingly insignifant impact,
procurement delays should be carefully monitored due to
their counter-productive potential.
Some savings have resulted from the implementation of
DoDD 7640.2 as Table XX points out. Information regarding





C 47. Have you experienced any dslay in procurement as






C 48. Do you believe that the overall effect of this






measure of government benefit cannot be accurately assessed.
Most of the auditors indicated that direct savings cannot be
determined. However they indicated that it is reasonable to
assume that DoDD 7640.2 will produce savings by improving
the negotiation process. It is rational to assume that
improved negotiations will produce savings, but there was no
evidence to support the belief that DoDD 7640.2 is achieving
the necessary improvement in the negotiation process.
By passing Public Law 96-304, Congress required that
audit findings be resolved within six months after a report
is issued. Congress intended to support a similar provision
found in Office of Management and Budget (OMB) Circular
A-73, "Audit of Federal Operations and Programs." However,
there appear to be seme differences in opinion among practi-
tioners and policy makers regarding the distinction between





A 38. In your organization, has there been any
C 49. documented recovery of public funds attributable




of audi* reports. 7 These differences canter on the circum-
stances which constitute each of those actions.
The responses to question 21 (item a) of Table XXI show
that 50% of all respondents believed that resolution of
audit recommendations should not occur until negotiations
with the contractor are concluded. Another 33% (response b)
of all respondents agreed that resolution hinges on the
decisions made by the contracting officer either before or
during negotiations. Responses (e) and (f) show that only
14% of the respondents agreed with the official definition
for resolution of audit recommendations given by DoDD
7640.2. In fact, responses (a), (b> , and (c) , which were
cited by 96% of all respondents, form the respondents* defi-
nition of resolution . According to DoDD 7640.2, the situ-
ations described by responses (a), ( b) , and (c) constitute
dispositio n. It seems that while DoDD 7640.2 emphasizes the
timely resolution of differences between auditor and
contracting officer, it nonetheless has achieved a "disposi-
tion" attitude in the minds of practitioners.
7 See definitions. Appendix A
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Audit recommendations may be expeditiously resolved
through the provisions of DoDD 7640.2, however quick resolu-
tion between the auditor and contracting officer doesn't
guarantee a timely disposition of the audit report. Table
XII illustrates that DoDD 7640.2 has had no appreciable
effect en the number of significant differences requiring
resolution. Therefore, a rational assumption is that dispo-
sition of audit reports is the primary goal of the foilowup
policy. The responses to question 3 of Table XI also
support this assertion, since it was a popular belief that
disposition of audit reports is neaied to appease political
critics.
Questions 22 and 23 of Table XXI evaluate the effect of
DoDD 7640.2 on the speed of resolution. Host respondents
(50%) indicated that there has been no effect from the
directive in this area. However, 33ft have experienced
quicker resolution, while only 19% have experienced a slowe:
process. As the data to question 23 show, quicker resolu-
tion has been unquestionably beneficial.
What is surprising is that of the three respondents who
have experienced slower resolution, two have found the
slower process to be beneficial. The most frequently given
reason for this view was that the six month time requirement
is not always in the government's bast interests. Some
audits, e.g. certain operations and overhead audits were
cited as requiring more time to resolve significant issues.
In those situations, pressuring for quick resolution can be
detrimental. On the other hand, two contracting officers
(9%) and one auditor (13%) have found detrimental effects
from a slower resolution rate.
1 • Beneficial Effects
Question 11 cf Table XXII shows how each group felt




Benefit of Quicker Resolution
21. In your opinion, when is the proper tima to consider
audit recommendations as resDlvad?
CONTR AUDIT BOTH
a. After negotiations when the
contracting officer reaches
agreement with the contractor 50% 50% 50%
b. When the contracting officer
makes a decision either befors
or during negotiations 4 1 25 33
c. When the contractor corrects
a deficiency or implements
audit recommendations 9 25 13
d. Varies according audit type 14 10
e. When Auditor and Contracting
Officer settle differences 9 7
f. When DISAO or Review Board
approves of the Contracting
Officer's position 5 13 7
22. As a result of the directive 7640.2, audit reports
are resolved:
CONTR AUDIT BOTH
Much quicker 0% 13% 3%
Somewhat quicker- 23 38 27
Nd change 54 38 50
Somewhat slower 14 13 13
Much slower 9 6



















11. How do you think the goals of the directive are
bene fie la 1?
CONTR AUDIT BOTH
a. Improved CO/auditor coordination
leading to betxer problem
visibility 27% 63% 37%
b. Management tool for contracting
officers 36 13 30
c. Goals are admirable, but directive
not needed. Goals stated elsewhere 23 13 20
d. No benefit 23 17
e. Improve timeliness of decision
making 18 13 17
f. Potential cost savings 14 25 17
g. Increases CO accountability which
Produces better supported decisions 38 10
etter supported DCAA reports 5 13 7
12. How do you think the goals of the directive are not
beneficial?
CONTR A UDI T BOTH
a. More administrative burden, and
bureaucratic growth potential 32% 13% 27%
b. No negative effects 14 63 27
c. Adverse affect on CO* s authoriy
and business judgment -» 27 13 23
d. A system to second-guess the 30 -- 27 20
e. More management time for Question-
able benefit since requirements
already exist 14 13 13
f. Overemphasis on quick resolution - 14 3 10
g. Negative effect on CO/Auditor
relationship 5 13 7
was the overwhelming preference of auditors, indicates that
the directive has improved coordination between the auditor
and the contracting officer, leading to better visibility of
problems. While 27% of the contracting group also cited
this as a benefit, slighty more (365) viewed the procedures
mandated by DoDD 7640.2 as a manageaent tool for contracting
officers. Only one auditor agreed with this view.
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Response (g) shows that 38ft of the auditors felt
that the contracting officer's accountability had increased,
with better supported decisions as a result. None of the
contracting group said that an increase in accountability
was a benefit of the directive, which illustrates the sensi-
tivity of the contracting group to the question cf account-
ability. That is understandable slice the contracting
officer is legally accountable for the contractual decisions
he makes. To suggest that DoDD 7643.2 has affected the
contractual accountability of the contracting officer would
clearly be in error, and contrary to the explicit statement
of the directive that "The contract audit followup system
shall be in consonance with the independent decision-making
role cf the contracting officer." [ Ref . 2: E-1 ]
Thirty-four percent of the respondents considered as
benefits: (1) the improved timeliness of decision-making;
and (2) the potential for cost savings to the Government
(responses e and f) . With respect to the timeliness of
decision-making, one Air Force Principal Administrative
contracting officer (PACO) made the following comment:
There is an unquestionable benefit which arises from the
emphasis on timeliness. There has been a tendency on
the Dart cf many contractina officers to delay their
decisions on tough problems! It seems that too often
decisions on audit recommendations are postponed until
there is an iron-clad case one way or the other.
However, this is unrealistic. The contracting officer
should be a decision-maker, and if he's doing his job
correctly, many of the decisions will be tough ones.
This policy will encourage the contracting otficer who
has a tendency to delay to speed up the decision-making
process.
A DCAS Manager/ACO also expressed concern over the timeli-
ness in which audit reports are settled.
The timeliness of resolution is important since economic
issues change so rapidly in the dynamic economic envi-
ronment of today. it's"a good idea to avoid allowing
these pricing issues to get old and turn into bio prob-
lems. However, the professional contractina officer
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should be resolving these issues without the policy
being issued.
In contrast to the benefits attested to by the
majority of comments to question 11, there were a signifi-
cant number of less favorable comments, almost entirely from
the contracting group. Responses (c) and (d) reveal that
46% of the contracting group (37% overall) either believed
that the directive had no beneficial effects or that any
benefits possibly arising from the policy are achievable
through existing guidance or through the professional
efforts of the work force.
2 • Detriiental Effects
Response (b) to question 12 reveals again the
support for DoDD 7640.2 within the auditing community. All
audit responses other than item (b) were qualified in the
sense that these non-benefits were believed not significant
enough to question the overall benefit of the policy. One
auditor stated that the directive can create ill feelings
between the auditor and the contracting officer, but that in
most cases the team concept will be encouraged. An audit
manager commented:
Like most directives, the over-reaction by affected
parties mitigate against its effectiveness. Toe much
paperwork and extensive management attention takes
valuable time away from other equally important func-
tions. However, the benefits far outweigh the draw-
backs.
In sharp contrast to the audit group's response,
only three of the twenty-two contracting respondents (14%)
believed that there were no negative effects from the
policy. Some of the contracting respondents were harsher
than ethers in their criticism of the directive. One Price
Analyst manager said that "the directive, as written,
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suggests that the opinions of pricing analysts, engineers,
and other advisers, are useless." Another contracting
manager added that "audit followup isn*t necessary if both
organizations do the tasks laid out in miles of existing
ins-ructions, directives, and legislation."
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VI. IMPACT ON CONTRACTING OFFICERS AND AUDITORS
A. AUTHORITY OF THE CONTRACTING OFFICER
The most publicized criticism of DoDD 7640.2 is its
alleged adverse affect on the independent, decision-making
authority of the contracting officer. The investigation of
that claim provided the initial focus and the primary moti-
vation fcr this research.
To fully appreciate the opinions of practitioners
regarding the authority of the contracting officer, one must
make a distinction between the different types of authority
vested in the contracting officer.
The Defense Acquisition Regulation (DAR) contains
details concerning the contracting officer's Certificate of
Appointment, commonly referred to as a "warrant" [Ref. 6:
1-405.2]. It is the warrant which certifies that the
contracting officer is an authorized agent of the Federal
Government with the cont ractual authority to bind the
government to legal agreements within specified limitations.
Expert advice is available to the contracting officer
from a variety of functional specialists which he may call
upon as necessary. However , the responsibility for deter-
mining the suitability of the pricing arrangement of a
contract rests solely with the contracting officer [Ref. 6:
3-801.2].
Since DoDD 7640.2 is an internal directive not published
in the Code of Federal Regulations, it cannot officially
alter the contractual authority of the contracting officer
which would in any way conflict with the provisions of the
Defense Acquisition Regulation (DAR). Nevertheless, the
data in Tables XXIII, XXI7, and XXV show that the directive
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has impaired the administrative authority of the contracting
officer, since he apparently has less control over other
areas of the decision-making process.
The responses to question 16 of Table XXIII indicate
that there was considerable difference of opinion between
the contracting and auditing groups over that issue. While
55% of the contracting officers perceived That their
authority has been weakened, cnly 25% of the auditors shared
that opinion. Most (75%) of the audit group believed that
the independent decision-making authority of the contracting
officer has been unaffected by the directive, an opinion
agreed upon by a relatively large portion (36^) of the
contracting group. Only two of the contracting group (9%)
believed that the contracting officer's authority has been
strengthened by DODD 7640.2.
Responses (a) and (b) to question 17 show that the
contracting officer's latitude in decision-making has been
narrowed. However there was a wide range in the comments to
that question. There were both advantages and disadvantages
which emerged from the opposing perspectives. Among the
contracting respondents, opinions were more negative in
nature, since contracting officers were concerned about the
potential for being "second-guessed." The requirement for
more extensive justification for decisions was also viewed
as a disadvantage. The following remarks by contracting
officers and managers highlight the majority opinion of that
group:
Contract audit is thought to be advisory. Accounting
ng
decision based on all inputs, not just DCAA. This
directive requires the contracting officer to elevate a
disagreement to higher management who may not be
familiar with the issue.
The impact from this directive is very important. The




Authority of the CO
16. In your opinion, how has DoDD 7640.2 affected
the independent, decision-making authority ot the
contracting officer?
CDNTR AUDIT 30TH
Weakened it 55% 25 47%
No effect 36 75 47
Strengthened it 9 t>
17. Would you please explain your opinion including why
you believe such an impact, is or is not important.
Weakened CONTR AQDIT BOTH
a. CO must elevate significant audit
issues which encourages less re-
sponsibility for decisions 36% 25% 33%
b. Auditor's power overemphasized — 27 20
c. CO frustration from administra-
tive burden. Less time for other
important tasks 5 3
No effect
d. CO has same contractual
authority, but less arbitrary 45% 50% 47%
e. Contracting officer still has
the responsibility for con-
tractual decisions 14 50 23
f. Only impact is administrative 14 10
g. Significant actions have always
been reviewed by senior acquisi-
tion official 5 3
Strengthened !
h. Causes the CO tc morecaref ully I
"think thrcuah" and document




aspects of the award of a contract. The auditor is
supposed to be a team member, no more, no less. This
policy change makes the auditor much mere powerful with
no check or balance on the quality of the audit.
The hardest thing for a government bureaucrat tc do
consistently is act independently and forcefully. The
system produces conformity and fosters the abdication of
responsibility. Under the new followup system, weak
contracting officers will become weaker, strong ones
will be more frustrated. That's important.
67

Although 50% of the auditors believed that the directive
makes the contracting officer less independent, their
comments also indicated that the actions of contracting
officers need closer scrutiny. The spirit of the audit
group's comments can best be captured in this statement by
an audit manager:
There is no change in the contracting officer's
authority. He may still deviate from audit recommenda-
tions. However, now he ausr document, explain, and in
some cases have an independent review of his decision.
To the extent that his independent decision-making flex-
ibility is constrained by the justification requirement,
the directive could be viewed as beneficial.
It is interesting to note the opinions of two (9%)
contracting officers who felt that OoDD 76U0.2 has strength-
ened their authority. Although they recognize that the
contracting officer is required to more thoroughly justify
his decisions regarding audit recomnendations, this require-
ment was considered an advantage. An Air Force PACO offers
an explanation for this position:
,g orricer on tne sgDt regarding t
" f th<sions he makes on audit recommendations. I e
contracting officer knows that he will have to defend
his position to hiaher authority, this should cause him
to think through a'situation more carefully and there-




ho does that will realize more authority, not because
f the regulation saying he has more or less authority,
»ut because he has done his homework.
B. ROLE OF THE DCAA AUDITOR
Contracting officers generally perceived that the DCAA
auditor's role is changing from the traditional role of team
member to one in which audit advice is virtually mandatory.
In the current environment of cost control and fiscal
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responsibility, DoDD 7640.2 has accorded audit advice pree-
minence over that received by the contracting officer from
other functional advisers. That appears to be a difficult
adjustment for most contracting officers who have perhaps
viewed the auditor's role as subordinate to their own. The
directive now requires justification to higher authority
whan the contracting officer decides to proceed upon a
course of action which significantly differs from the audi-
tor's recommendations. Many contracting officers and
managers believed that the new audit followup procedures
reflect decliaing confidence in the procurement work force.
It is interesting to note that the notion of elevating
significant differences between the contracting officer and
auditor is not a new idea. The Defsnse Contract Audit
Advisory Council (DCAAC) recommended over a decade ago that
those differences be elevated to ensure that a DoD position
is agreed upoo on a timely basis, thereby avoiding costly
delays [fief- 7]. However, until rhs DoD policy for contract
audit followup was implemented, the only requirement: for
contracting officer deviations from audit advice was to
document, the contract file [fief. 6:3-801.2 (d) ].
Shortly before the DCAAC*s report, then Deputy Secretary
of Defense David Packard issued a memorandum emphasizing the
advisory role of the contract auditor. The memo also clari-
fied the DcD position on elevating disputes between
contracting officers and auditors:
advice of auditors is essential to good Defense
contracting. The contracting officer must consider such
dvice. Nevertheless, contracting officers' decisic.ons
on matters of contract pricing haye to taka into account
many factors in addition to those presented by the audi-
tors. It is, therefore, necessary that all those
responsible for furnishing support to the contracting
officer understand the advisory role they should play.
We should avoid actions by auditors in their advisory
capacity which appear to dispute or question specific
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decisions of contracting officers. I want our
contracting people to exercise judgment in their
day-to-day work. The escalation of possible disputes
relative to specific decisions should be avoided. If f
however, such decisions or judgment have general appli-
cation and, in the professional opinion of the auditor,
indicate a change or trend in pricing or costing policy,
the auditors may, of course, transmit the appropriate
information through audit command cnannels. [Ref. 8].
TABLE XXIV
Auditors Influence on CO
18, In your opinicn, how has the authority of the DCAA
auditor been affected by directive 7640.2?
CONTR AUDIT BOTH
a. Strenathened auditor's role or
influence vis-a-vis the
contracting officer 59% 50*o 57%
b. No effect on authority; auditor
still has same advisory role and
responsibilities 45 50 47
c. Dislike term "authority" which
implies that auditor has
contractual authority 14 25 17
Deputy Secretary Packard's memo illustrates well the
traditional DoD philosophy regarding the advisory role, not
only of auditors, but of all functional specialists who are
available to counsel the contracting officer.
Response 18(a) of Table XXIV indicates that the provi-
sions of DoDD 7640.2 have affected the auditor's influence
on the contracting officer. The balanced responses to items
(a) and (b) are an interesting finding, particularly when
considering the comments related to auditors' authority.
Those respondents who felt that the auditor's role has been
strengthened spoke out at length while only brief comments
were offered in support of the "no effect" opinions of
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category (b) . The following comments help to illustrate the
opinions of those respondents who believed that the audi-
tor's role has been enhanced:
An audit manager: Would rather not use the word
"authority" in referring to the auditor's relationship
with the contracting officer. However, the auditor's
influence on the contracting officer has been strength-
ened.
An auditor: Now we have expanded duties to document a
contracting officer's failure to have a DIS AO review.
We will probably also be somewhat involved in answering
internal audit questions during reviews of compliance
with the directive.
An Air Force manager: Technically, the auditor is still
an adviser. However, the auditor has an avenue for
This defi-
A Navy PCO: Don't like the use of the word "authority"
in connection with the auditor. That implies contrac-
tual authority which the auditor doesn't have. "Role"
may be okay, but "influence" is an even better word.
The auditor has been given much more power to influence
the contracting officer.
A DCAS Manager/ACO : The audit position becomes mora of
a non-negotiable baseline which' severely limits a
contracting officer in negotiations.
A DCAS ACO: The auditor's star is rising. The
contracting officer has been Dut on the defensive due to
the auditor's appeal process."
C. RELATIONSHIPS
As the data in Table XXV indicates, auditors and
contracting officers even failed to agree about the nature
of their disagreements. Contracting officers said that they
always explain their disagreements to the auditor (C 31)
while the majority of the audit group (62%) said that
contracting officers usually don't communicate their posi-





A 28. Prior to the advent of 7643. 2, when a contracting
officer disagreed with your recommendations, did




C 31. Before 7640.2, when you disagreed with the
auditor's recommendations, did you usually




C 32. Do you now generally resolve such disagreements





A 29. Do you usually find it easy to establish good






e you been able to establish good rapport with





The method which most contracting officers choose for
communicating with the auditor undoubtedly has a lot to do
with the dissenting viewpoints of the two groups. Host

(80%) of the contracting officers interviewed said that they
rely almost entirely on the Price Negotiation Memorandum
(PNM) 8 to communicate their position to the auditor. The
PNM is required by the Defense Acquisition Regulation (DAS)
and serves the purpose of documenting:
1. The contracting officer's pre-negctiation position,
including negotiation objectives and/or aspirations,
2. The major proceedings of the negotiation with the
contractor, and
3. The results of the negotiation.
The majority opinion of contracting officers was that
the PNM provides sufficient explanation to the auditor
except for unusual cases where closer communication is
necessary to resolve a significant issue and attain a united
government position before proceeding into negotiations.
Obviously, where the auditor participates in negotiations,
there will be more informal communciation with the
contracting officer, particularly with regard to planning
the negotiations.
The following comment (to question A28) by an audit
manager helps to clarify the primary reason why auditors
consider most contracting officers 1 explanations to be
inadequate:
The key word here is "usually." Apparently some
contracting officers do, others don't. Most contracting
officers give some explanation of their use of audit
findinas in their Price Negotiation Memorandum,
including justifications for their decisions. But the
PNM isn't always received bv DCAA. DoDD 7640.2 will
require comprehensive justification in the PNM and also
ensure that it is transmitted to the DCAA auditor.
The contracting officers' responses to questions C31 and
C32 are interesting since they clear y show that the policy
has affected the willingness of contracting officers to seek
8 See definitions, Appendix A
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resolution with the auditor. The six contracting officers
(32%) who answered "no" to question C32 indicated that since
the policy has been in effect, auditors seem more inflexible
in their positions, and in the interest of time, they
elevate their pr e-negotiation differences for independent
review. One Air Force manager attempted to put his finger
on the issue:
Since the oolicy dcesn*t allow the auditor to change his
mind, the contracting officer is going to pursue -He
course of action that is correct with resDect to the
inputs received from all his advisers. What reason is
there for the contracting officer to discuss his posi-
tion? Even if the auditor agrees with the contracting
officer, he can't change his report. Reporting to DoD
continues until negotiations are completed, a contrac-
tual agreement reached, or the report is otherwise
disposed.
The data presented in response to questions A29 and C33
of Table XXV might lead one to conclude that there are
inconsistencies in the responses of the two groups regarding
the contracting of ficer/auditor relationship. However, a
closer examination shews that the differing points of view
are related only to the area of resolving differences of
opinion on audit recommendations, not the overall relation-
ship between the two parties. Most respondents acknowledged
that a sound fundamental relationship between the
contracting officer and auditor is necessary to execute
contractual arrangements that are a:st advantageous to the
government. A DCAS ACO expressed this opinion:
An interesting perception of Congress, GAO f DoD, ana
other top level officials is that DCAA auditors and DoD
contracting officers are alwavs in conflict or disagree-
ment. I believe that while DCAA may have supported this
policy in the beginning, there is less support for it
now. at least in the field. I think many" auditors




Although some respondents indicated that good rapport isn't
always easy to achieve, they view it as a vital ingredient
to an effective DoD procurement system.
1 . Changes in Attitudes
Table XXVI (question A30) shows that auditors have
encountered a wids range of effects from the directive en
TABLE XXVI
Changes in Attitudes
A 30. What changes if any have you noticed in the
attitudes of contracting officers that could be
linked to the implementation of this directive?
AUDIT
a. Contracting officers more willing to discuss
positions with DCAA 63%
b. No change in attitude 25
c. Contracting officers more adversarial 25
d. Contracting officers dislike the directive 12
C 34. What changes if any have you noticed in the
attitudes of auditors that could be linked to the
implementation of this directive?
CONTR
a. No change in attitude 72%
b. Auditors less hesitant to ensure Contracting
Officers comply with directive; more probing - 9
c. Auditors concerned chat policy causes mora
rifts between them and contracting officers — 9
d. Auditors more concerned that audit is
defensible 9
the attitudes of contracting officers. Response (a) indi-
cates that most contracting officers (63%) have become mere
cooperative with the auditor. However, it is important to
recognize that two (25%) of the auditors (responses c and d)
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perceived contracting officers as more adversarial. That is
attibutable to a common perception among the contracting
group that DCAA was highly influential in DoD's decision to
institute the followup policy. In spite of that opinion,
the responses to question C3U show that most of the
contracting group (72£) have noticed no change in auditors*
attitudes.
Although three of the audit group (37^) mentioned
negative apsects of the policy (responses c and d tc ques-
tion A30) , comments generally focused on the increase in
cooperation which has resulted. Auditors felt that
contracting officers have become more willing to coordinate
their planned actions with the DCAA auditor. One audit
manager cited a particular type of occurence which the
directive tends to discourage:
Contracting officers have always looked to auditors for
concurrence in order to justify and support their deci-
sions. Oftentimes I have had contracting officers ask
me to change my report based on the contracting offi-
cer's discussions with the contractor. What usually
happens is that the contracting officer will give the
contractor a copy of the audit report, and the
contractor in tarn will direct his high-powered
resources to refute the findings. The contractor will
often convince the contractina officer that the auditor
is being unreasonable and suggest that he attempt to get
the auditor to agree with the contractor's position.
Two additional audit respondents agreed with the
audit manager's point of view. They believed that DoDD
7640.2 will increase coordination between the auditor and
contracting officer, giving the contracting officer both a
better audit report and a fuller understanding of the
pricing issues. They indicated that closer communication
and cooperation between the contracting officer and auditor
will reduce the tendency of contracting officers to accept a
contractor's arguments without first consulting the auditor.
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2- Effect on Contract Negotiati ons
Table XXVII addresses the impact from DoDD 7640.2 on
the negotiation process. While 50% of the contracting group
has experienced no effect from the directive's requirements,
H5% felt that less effective negotiations have resulted.
The issues raised by the contracting group with respect to
the negotiation process merit repeating:
Air Force manaaer: It hasn't affected technique.
However- it has reguired additional time, most of which
is devoted to convincing the auditor that he should
vacate positions not based on substantial evidence
rather than allowing those issues to be elevated.
DCAS manager: This policy can cause delays and create
internal problems on the government's negotiation team.
The contracting officer's authority going into a negoti-
ation is weaker since he is put en the defensive with
respect tc the government players (team members) . It
assumes the auditor is the standard. Audit is given
more weight over other advisory sources.
Air Force manager: I am more conscious of audit recom-
mendations, and invite the auditors to negotiations more
frequently. However, the process has been slowed down.
Calculations take longer, and preparing for the DISAO
review takes more time away. These differences are more
visible to the contractor and are to his advantage.
The remaining questions in Table XXVII have no
direct relationship to the implementation of DoDD 7640.2.
However, those questions were intended to reveal the atti-
tudes of contracting officers regarding the participation of
auditors in negotiations. Increased participation by audi-
tors in the negotiation process is not an expressly stated
goal of the directive. However, an audit manager expressed
his view regarding the importance of this issue:
The auditor shoul-d definitely participate in more nego-
tiations. This is a very political question internally
(i.e. within DCAA) . DCAa management feels that the
auditors' participation in negotiations makes them
better prepared to defend their findings. The auditor
who participates in negotiations will ce more prudent in





C 27. How has the directive affected the way ycu
negotiate?
CONTR
a. No effect 50fo
b. Less effective negotiations due to divided
government position 27
c. Less effective negotiations due to delays and
less time for planning 23
C 28. What percentage of major negotiations in which
you have participated also included the auditor
as a participant?
CONTR
a. Respondents who said 100^ 50%
b. Respondents who said 10 - 5% 13
c. Respondents who said none 18
d. Respondents who said 70 - 30& 14
A 26. How often have you participated in negotiations









C 30. What is your opinion about auditcrs participating
in negotiations with a contractor?
CONTR
a. A good idea only if auditor realizes that the
contracting officer is the team leader 41%
b. Auditor's participation is generally helpful-- 36
c. Auditor's participation is of some value
depending on the situation 23
d. Auditor's participation is absolutely
essential due to tactical importance as
financial expert 18






Contracting officers have generally found auditors
helpful in negotiations (C29) and uianimously agreed that
auditors should participate, provided that the contracting
officer has the authority to control the government's input
to the process. The following two statements from the
contracting group best convey the general feeling of the
group regarding the auditor's participation in negotiations:
Navy ACO: I believe that a good auditor working as a
team member is vital to effective negotiation. On the
other hand, a weak auditor, or worse t a "treasurehunter," can disrupt negotiations ana split the team.
This is a condition which is understandably exploited by
contractors.
DCAS manaaer: I think it's a good idea, definitely
beneficial and productive, provided that the contracting
officer retains ultimate authority to plan, conduct, and
consummate the negotiations. The presence of the
auditor gives the government, team more options in its
strategy with the contractor, but everyone should be




VII. SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS . AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A. SUMMARY
The primary purpose of this study was to investigate and
report the effects of DoD's contract audit foiiowup policy
on the independent, decision-making authority of the
contracting officer. The auditors role in defense
contracting and the relationship between the contracting
officer and auditor were also examiaed. To determine the
overall impact of the policy on the procurement process,
numerous other areas related to contract auditing were
explored.
The conclusions and recommendations that follow are
based upon the perceptions of the participants of this study
and the author • s interpretation of those perceptions.
References are made to selected literature sources where
appropriate.
B. CONCLUSIONS
THE POLICY ATTRACTS UNNECESSARY ATTENTION TO THE
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE CONTRACTING OFFICER AND THE
CONTRACT AUDITOR.
This study has shown that audit advice was used exten-
sively by contracting officers prior to DoD*s contract audit
followup policy. The policy has net affected the number of
significant differences of opinion between the contracting
officer and auditor, nor has it affected the manner of
achieving disposition of those audit reports containing
significant recommendations. Likewise, the speed of
resolving differences has essentially remained the same.
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Close, effective communication between the contracting
officer and auditor cannot be achieved through mandate.
Here this possible, ideal relationships would currently
exist between every contracting officer and auditor due to
existing regulation [Ref. 6:3-801. 5(b) (8) ]• Likewise,
forcing the resolution of disagreemsnts where the will for
reconciliation dees not realistically exist is inadvisable,
and cannot be expected to improve the fundamental relation-
ship between the contracting officer and auditor.
A comparison of the professional competency of the two
groups is instructive. The Defense Contract Audit Agency
employs a highly professional staff of accountants and audi-
tors, 95% of whom are college graduates and 20% Certified
Public Accountants (CPAs) [Ref. 9]. In contrast, recent
statistics published by the Federal Acquisition Institute
show that the DoD contracting work force averages only 42%
college graduates [Ref. 10].
Because contract auditors on the average are more
professionally competent than contracting officers, they
gain authority from their special knowledge and expertise in
the accounting, pricing, and costing areas. That is a
well-acknowledged psychological phenomenon known as "expert
power." The contracting officer is heavily dependent on the
auditor for data that is essential to establishing sound
pricing arrangements. The same is true for the contracting
officer's other professional advisers. It is doubtful that
a contracting officer would disagres with the recommenda-
tions of an auditor unless such a decision incorporated the
overriding recommendations of other expert advisers. The
contract audit followup policy mandated in DoDD 7640. 2 has
the effect of decreasing the effectiveness of the relation-
ship between the contracting officer and auditor by artifi-
cially shifting their respective authority.
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THE INDEPENDENT BOLE OF THE CONTRACTING OFFICER HAS BEEN
ADVERSELY AFFECTED.
The contracting officer 1 s freedom to disagree with the
recommendations of advisers has been restricted by the
requirements for: (1) extensive justification for decisions,
(2) senior management review of position, (3) comprehensive
reporting to higher authority, and (4) DCAA's right to
appeal decisions.
The paramount goal of defense procurement should be to
achieve an optimal contractual arrangement. Such an
arrangement cannot be expected to incorporate the unanimous
support and agreement from all of the contracting officer*s
advisers. The contracting officer is a manager of advisory
resources. In this capacity, it is critical that he remain
independent from excessive influence in any one area.
The directive provides no option for the auditor to
withdraw a recommendation once an audit report is issued.
The contracting officer mast either accept the auditor's
recommendations or assume the burden of explaining why the
auditor is not correct. In addition, the auditor has the
right to appeal the decision of the contracting officer
where a pattern of disagreement is considered to exist, a
recourse not available to other advisers. It is much less
complicated for the contracting officer to agree with audit
advice than to take issue with it.
Advisers communicate their input to the contracting
officer prior to his reaching a decision. Sines DoDD 7640.2
requires the "advice" of local management after the
contracting officer has decided upon his position, the
directive essentially casts local management as a second-
guesser.
The management review should work as an information
system for local management. Local management, should have
control over the review process, with the authority to
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establish the appropriate procedures for conducting an inde-
pendent review and to determine the circumstances that must
exist before the review is required. That authority would
permit local management to decide the most advantageous use
of management and administrative resources.
Contracting officers can psychologically accept an
advisees authority that arises from his expertise and still
maintain a healthy self-image as the team leader. However,
as the findings of this study have shown, the self-
confidence of the contracting work force has been inhibited
by forced resolution, excessive reporting, and intensive
management involvement.
THE DIRECTIVE HAS FAILED TO IMPROVE EFFECTIVE USE OF THE
GOVERNMENTS AUDIT RESOURCES.
There has been no appreciable effect on the resolution
of significant differences of opinion between contracting
officers and auditors. The time required to achieve resolu-
tion has essentially remained unchanged. The frequency with
which significant differences occur has not changed, and all
"independent" management reviews reported in this study have
been decided in favor of the contracting officer. However,
with the addition of the management review process, the
potential exists for further delay in disposing of audit
reports.
There is no evidence that the directive has saved the
government money. However, most participants believed that
comprehensive reporting through every level of management
overburdens administrative resources and is counter-




THE DIRECTIVE IMPOSES ECONOMICALLY QUESTIONABLE GOALS ON
DOD PROCUREMENT.
DoD's critics believe that the department as a whole has
failed to fully utilize its audit resources. DoD's backlog
of overaged contract audit reports has contributed signifi-
cantly to creating an image of questionable integrity and
prudence in its procurement system. That image has caused
diminishing trust in the ability of the procurment work
force to ensure that audit advice receives proper attention.
The participants of this study pointed to the political
necessity of issuing DoDD 5000.42 and DoDD 7640.2. The
audit followup policy requires intensive management of a
politically sensitive area. However, there is no objective
justification for concluding that there has been a favorable
cost/benefit ratio achieved by more timely disposition of
audit reports. On the other hand, there is evidence that
DoD's backlog of overaged contract audit reports fails to
support the nation that DoD contractors are receiving exces-
sive profits. Defense contractors are less profitable than
their commercial counterparts, a situation that has made the
defense industry less attractive to prospective contractors
fRef. 11]. If defense contractors were excessively profit-
able, the industry would be expanding rather than dwindling.
C. RECOMMENDATIONS
CONGRESS SHOULD EXEMPT CONTRACT AUDIT REPORTS FROM THE
LEGAL REQUIREMENT FOR RESOLUTION.
That action would enable DoD to cancel DoDD 7640.2.
DOD SHOULD CANCEL DODD 7640.2.
The followup of contract audit reports is a valid
concept. However, local management should be given the
authority to establish the followup procedures that it
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considers appropriate. Management should then be made
responsible for ensuring that procurement and audit
resources are used most effectively and efficiently.
IF THE FIRST TWO RECOMMENDATIONS ARE NOT FEASIBLE, DOD
SHOULD REVISE DODD 7640.2 AS FOLLOWS:
1. Delete all status reports not specifically required by
higher authority. Semi-annual reports -chat are required
should be initiated by DCAA. Close communication with
contracting officers will ensure that only overaged audit
reports are reported to top management.
2. Eliminate the requirement for mandatory senior manage-
ment review of unresolved audit recommendations. Local
management should have the discretion to establish the
procedures that are considered necessary to identify and
resolve significant audit issues.
D. CONSIDERATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH
The Defense Manpower Data Center is currently conducting
a nationwide survey cf the effects of DoDD 7640.2 on defense
procurement. The results of that study should be considered
in any decision regarding further research into the policy




KEY DEFINITIONS AND ACRONYMS
Contract Audit: The systematic examination of records and
documents and/or the securing of other evidence by confirma-
tion, physical inspection, or otherwise, for one or more of
the following purposes: (1) determining the propriety or
legality of proposed or consummated transactions; (2) ascer-
taining whether all transactions have been recorded and are
reflected accurately in accounts; (3) determining the exis-
tence of recorded assets and inclusi veness of recorded
liabilities; (4) determining the accuracy of financial or
statistical statements or reports and the fairness of the
facts they present; (5) determining the degree of compliance
with established policies and procedures relative to finan-
cial transactions and business management; and (6)
appraising an accounting system and making recommendations
concerning it.
Contract Audit or: A professional accountant acting as a
principal advisor to contracting officers on contractor
accounting and contract audit matters.
Contract Au dit Report: The contract auditor 1 s written
advice to a contracting officer advocating specific action
on the part of the contracting officer or contractor. An
audit report could include amounts questioned or disap-
proved, exceptions to a contractor's system or operations,
usually expressed in terms of cost avoidance, or notifica-
tion of a contractor's non-compliance with Cost Accounting
Standards (CAS) . Any cost set aside as "unsupported" or
"unresolved" will not be considered as a recommendation.
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Contracting Officer: Any person who, either by virtue of
his/her position or by appointment in accordance with
prescribed regulations, is vested with the authority to
enter into and administer contracts and make determinations
and findings with respect thereto, or with any part of such
authority. In this thesis, two kinds of contracting offi-
cers are identified: Procuring Contracting Officer (PCO)
,
and Administrative Contracting Officer (ACO)
.
Cost or Pricing Data: Data consisting of all facts existing
up to the time of agreement on price, which prudent buyers
and sellers would reasonably expect to have a significant
effect on price negotiations. Being factual, these data are
types of information that can be verified. They do not
reflect on the accuracy of the contractors judgment about
estimated future costs or projections; they do, however,
reflect on the data upon which the contractor based his
judgment.
Costs Questioned Sustained; That portion of costs ques-
tioned by the auditor that is upheli as a result of actions
taken either by the contractor or the contracting officer.
Disposition of Contract Audit Reports: Contract audit
report disposition is acheived when: (1) the contractor
implements the audit recommendations; or (2) the contracting
officer negotiates a settlement with the contractor; or (3)
the contracting officer makes a unilateral decision; or (4)
a decision has been rendered on an appeal made to the Armed
Services Board of Contract Appeals (ASBCA) or U.S. Claims
Court; and (5) all corrective actiois deemed necessary by
the contracting officer have been taken and no further
actions can be reasonably anticipated.
0lS£.§2ed Audit Report: An audit report which remains open
over six months from the date of issuance..
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££i£.§ Negotiation Memorandum: Tha document that relates the
story of the negotiation. It is first a sales document that
establishes the reasonableness of the agreement reached with
the successful offeror. Second, it is the permanent record
of the decisions of the negotiator made in establishing that
the price was fair and reasonable. Called the PNM.
Resolution: The point at which the audit organization and
the contracting officer agree on the action to be taken on
audit report recommendations; or, in the event of; disagree-
ment, when the matters are elevated for review by the DISAO
and its recomnendations have been considered by the
contracting officer and he or she has selected a course of
action.
ACO Administrative Contracting Officer
CO Contracting Officer
COIN Contracting Officers Information Network
DCAA Defense Contract Audit Agency
DCAS Defense Contract Administration Services
DISAO Designated Independent Senior Acguistion Official
DLA Defense Logistics Agency
DoD Department of Defense
DoDD Department of Defense Directive
FAI Federal Acquisrion Institute
GAO General Accounting Office
OFPP Office of Federal Procurement Policy
OMB Office of Management and Budget
PCO Procuring Contracting Officer
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DoD Directive 5000.42, "Policy for Follow-up on
Audit Recommendations," August 31, 198] (hereby
canceled)
Office of Management and Budget (0MB) Circular
A-50 (Revised), "Audit Followup," Sentember 29,
1982
DoD Directive 5000.41, "Followup on Reports from the
General Accounting Office and Audit and Internal
Review Organizations of the Department of Defense,"
March 15, 1982
through (h), see enclosure 1
A. PURPOSE
This Directive reissues reference (a), impleaents reference (b)
by prescribing followup policies and a system for management action
on contract audit reports, and assigns responsibilities.
B. APPLICABILITY
This Directive applies to the Office of the Secretary of Defense,
the Military Departments, the Organization of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff, and the Defense Agencies (hereafter referred to as "DoD Com-
ponents"). '
C. POLICY
The Department of Defense recognizes, under reference (c), the
need for special guidance for followup on contract audit reports to
accommodate the differences between such audits or reviews and those
performed by internal auditors. The contract audit followup system
provides for (a) tracking and reporting specified types of contract
audit reports; (b) a procedure to review differences on the resolu-
tion of contract audit recommendations; and (c) an evaluation of the
effectiveness of the DoD Components' followup systems.
D. DEFINITIONS




1. General . Contracting officers and acquisition management officials
shall pursue timely resolution and disposition of contract audit reports.
Resolution of contract audit reports by law is required within 6 months of
report issuance, and disposition normally shall be completed within 6 months.
The contract audit followup system shall be structured in consonance with the
independent decisionmaking role of the contracting officer and the financial
advisory role of the contract auditor.
2. Tracking Requirements
a. All contract audit reports are to be tracked; however, only the
contract audits specified in paragraph E.3.a., below, are to be reported. For
preaward contract audits, tracking may be accomplished using records maintained
in official contract files.
/
b. Individual procurement or contract administration offices shall
track the status of all specified contract audit reports from the date of
receipt through final disposition. This information shall be maintained on a
current basis and shall serve as the source document for followup status re-
ports. Audit reports may be dropped from the tracking system in the period
following closing.
3. Reporting Requirements
a. Audit reports covering forward pricing proposals, advance rate
agreements, progress payments, and closing statements are not required to be
reported. DoD acquisition and contract administration organizations shall
maintain timely and complete information regarding the status of reportable
contract audit reports from the time the report is received through final dis-
position. Reportable audit reports are:
(1) Those containing recommendations covering estimating system
surveys, accounting system reviews, internal control reviews, defective pricing
reviews, cost accounting standards noncompliance determinations, and operations
audits.
(2) Those covering incurred costs, settlement of indirect cost
rates, final pricing submissions, termination settlement proposals, equitable
adjustment claims, hardship claims, and escalation claims provided reported
costs or rates questioned equal $50,000 or more.
b. The information maintained by DoD Components regarding the status
of reportable contract audits shall be reported semiannually and include the
following data:
(1) For reports closed during the reporting period . The audit
report number, report date, contractor name, type of audit, date of disposition,
costs questioned or cost avoidance, and costs questioned or avoidance sustained.
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(2) For open reports . The audit report number, report date, con-
tractor name, type of audit, amount audited, costs questioned or cost avoidance,
whether
-an independent review was requested, whether the report is pending liti-
gation, whether the report is resolved or unresolved, and disposition target
date.
(3) Followup status reports (enclosure 3) for semiannual periods
ending March 31 and September 30 shall be submitted to the Inspector General,
DoD, (IG), within 30 calendar days after the end of the period.
4. Resolution of Contract Audit Report Recommendations
a. From the time of audit report receipt to the time of final disposi-
tion of the audit report, there shall be continuous communication between the
auditor and the contracting officer. When the contracting officer's proposed
disposition of contract audit report recommendations differs from the contract
auditor's report recommendations, and the criteria set forth below are met, the
contracting officer's proposed disposition shall be brought promptly to the
attention of a designated independent senior acquisition official or board
(DISAO) for review. Each DoD acquisition component shall designate a DISAO at
each appropriate organizational level who shall review the referred proposed
disposition on the following:
(1) All audit reports covering estimating system surveys, account-
ing system reviews, internal control reviews, defective pricing reviews, cost
accounting standards noncompliance reviews, and operations audits.
(2) Audit reports covering incurred costs, settlement of indirect
cost rates, final pricings, terminations, equitable adjustment claims, hard-
ship claims, and escalation claims if total costs questioned equal $50,000 or
more and differences between the contracting officer and auditor total at
least 5 percent of questioned costs.
(3) Prenegotiation objectives for forward pricing actions when
questioned costs total at least $500,000 and unresolved differences between the
auditor and contracting officer total at least 5 percent of the total questioned
costs.
b. Existing acquisition review boards or panels, at appropriate organi-
zational levels, may be designated to perform these functions provided they
possess enough independence to conduct an impartial review. The DISAO will re-
ceive for review, along with other technical materials, the contract auditor's
report. The DISAO shall give careful consideration to recommendations of the
.auditors, as well as the recommendations rendered by the other members of the
contracting officer's team, in reviewing the position of the contracting offi-
cer. The DISAO shall provide to the contracting officer, with a copy to the
contract auditor, a clear, written recommendation concerning all matters sub-
ject to review.
5. Notification of Final Disposition -of Contract Audit Report
a. Any followup system requires adequate feedback to the auditor on
the final disposition of audit reports. Therefore, the contracting officer
shall prepare a memorandum covering the disposition of all audit reports. The
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memorandum shall discuss the disposition of all audit report recommendations, in-
cluding the underlying rationale for such dispositions. In the event a DISAO
review was obtained, the memorandum also shall discuss the disposition of the
DISAO recommendations. A copy of the memorandum shall be provided to the cogni-
zant contract auditor and to the DISAO.
b. Existing feedback reports such as a price negotiation memorandum
(DAR 3-811(a), reference (d)) or a written overhead negotiation memorandum
(DAR 3-705(b)(5), reference (d)) may be used, when applicable. For all other
actions a similar document shall be prepared. To ensure that the final dis-
position of all audit reports is properly accounted for, each DoD Component's
procurement or administrative contracting officer shall notify the cognizant
audit office in writing of cancellations of any acquisition action and of any
unsuccessful offerors not receiving award of a contract or grant for which an
audit report was issued.
6. Recovery of Funds . Policies regarding the DoD credit management and
debt collection program are contained in DoD Directive 7045.13 (reference (e))
and in Appendix E of the DAR (reference (d)) for contract debts. Paragraph
E.4.f. of DoD Directive 5000.41 (reference (c)) requires the establishment of
an account receivable when management agrees with the auditors that resources
shall be recovered. General ledger accounts for recording accounts receivable
and collections are detailed in Appendix B of DoD 7220. 9-H (reference (f)).
7. Coordination with Other Agencies . The cognizant contracting office
responsible for acting on contract audit reports that affect contracts of
other government agencies shall inform affected organizations of such actions.
F. RESPONSIBILITIES
1. The Secretaries of the Military Departments and the Directors of the
Defense Agencies shall:
a. Designate a senior management official (SMO) to serve as a focal
point for the audit followup function. The SMO shall be responsible for
establishing the DoD Component's followup procedures for contract audits and
for the system's overall operation, tracking, and reporting requirements.
b. Designate DISAOs within their DoD Components' procurement and con-
tract administration functions who shall review those cases where the contract-
ing officer's proposed disposition of contract audit report recommendations
differs from the contract auditor's report recommendations.
c. Ensure that periodic evaluations of their Components' followup sys-
tems are performed to determine that the systems are adequate and result in
timely and appropriate resolution 3nd disposition of audit reports. The Mili-
tary Departments shall _ have their internal audit organizations perform these
reviews. The Assistant Inspector General .for Auditing shall review the Defense
Agencies' followup systems.
2. The Inspector General, DoD, shall develop policy and monitor and
coordinate contract audit followup systems in the Department of Defense. In
discharging this responsibility, the IG shall:
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i. Develop policy and provide guidance to DoD Components on matters
covered under this Directive.
b. Monitor and evaluate program performance and the adherence of DoD
Components to contract audit followup policies and procedures.
c. Conduct oversight reviews that are determined necessary to ensure
that DoD Components concerned are evaluating effectively contract audit follow-
up systems.
d. Identify cases or areas where contract audit followup procedures can
be improved and recommend appropriate corrective action to the DoD Component
head concerned.
e. Obtain such reports consistent with the policies of DoD Directive
5000.19 (reference (g)) and conduct oversight reviews necessary to ensure that
DoD followup systems are timely and effective.
f. Provide reports to the Secretary of Defense, including those
required by 0MB Circular A-50 (reference (b)).
3. The Senior Management Official (SMO) for each DoD Component shall:
a. Establish procedures for maintenance of formal records on all
applicable contract audit reports covered in section D. , enclosure 4.
b. Establish procedures to monitor the timely resolution and disposi-
tion of contract audit reports.
c. Maintain consolidated records of the status of all reportable con-
tract audit reports.
#
d. Prepare the DoD Component's semiannual status report and submit
it to the IG in accordance with the procedures in subsection E.3., above, and
enclosure 3 of this Directive.
4. The DoD Components' Designated Independent Senior Acquisition Officials
or Boards (DISAOs) shall have enough independence to conduct an impartial
review of issues brought before them and shall:
a. Review the contracting officer's proposed disposition of contract
audit recommendations when the contracting officer proposes to resolve the
issue in a manner substantially different from the contract auditor's reported
recommendation (see subsection E.4., above). Such reviews shall be initiated
by the cognizant contracting officer whose prenegotiation objective or proposed
disposition of a contract, audit report shall be forwarded' for review to the
DISAOs. The DISAOs may request that the auditor or contracting officer provide
additional input. The DISAOs shall review the issues being referred, make a
specific written recommendation to the contracting officer, and provide a copy
of the recommendation to the contract auditor concerned.
b. Identify needs for additional or revised guidance or changes in,
policy or regulatory requirements and forward details to the DoD Component
concerned with suggestions for the change or additional guidance needed.
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5. Managers f Individual DoD Procurement Contract Administration Offices
shall ensure that appropriate action is taken to:
a. Resolve promptly all contract audit reports in accordance with
acquisition guidelines and the requirements of this Directive.
b. Track the status of actions on all contract audit reports from the
date of receipt through disposition.
c. Establish and monitor procedures to ensure the forwarding of re-
quired information to the DISAO responsible for reviewing differences of
opinion on contract audit reports.
d. Maintain and provide information required in section E., above.
6. Heads of the Cognizant DoD Internal Audit Organizations shall:
a. Be responsible for internal reviews to determine if the DoD Compo-
nents' followup systems are adequate and result in timely and appropriate reso-
lution and disposition of audit reports.
b. Complete the first evaluation of the system within 1 year of the
system's implementation and perform evaluations not less than every 2 years
thereafter.
7. The Director, Defense Contract Audit Agency (DCAA)
,
and Heads of Other
Contract Audit Organizations shall:
a. Provide timely and complete support to any DISAO' s request for
factual information or audit opinions regarding the audit reports under review.
b. Monitor all final disposition and negotiation memoranda received.
When the memoranda indicate that a pattern of substantial differences of
opinion exists on the disposition of contract audit reports, whether the con-
tracting officer did or did not request reviews by the DISAO, the contract
audit field office auditor shall refer the matter to the cognizant DCAA
regional director. The regional director shall review these cases with the
cognizant SMO. When a memorandum indicates that there is a substantial dif-
ference of opinion on the disposition of an audit report, and the contracting
officer did not request a review by the DISAO, the auditor shall provide
written notification of the observation to the contracting officer requesting
that similar differences be elevated for review in the future and maintain a
copy of all notifications to be available to the IG and internal auditors, upon
request.
c. Provide timely and complete support to the IG and any internal •
audit organization reviewing a DoD Component's contract audit followup system,
in accordance with DoD Instruction 7600.3 (reference (h)).
d. Identify for the DoD procurement or administrative component, at
the time of issuance, all contract audit reports reportable under subsection







The reporting requirements of this Directive have been assigned Report
Control Symbol DD-R&O(SA)1580.
H. EFFECTIVE DATE AND IMPLEMENTATION
This Directive is effective immediately. Forward one copy of implementing
documents to the Inspector General, Department of Defense, within 120 days.




3. Followup Status Reports
4. Contract Audit Reports Subject to Tracking, Reporting,





(d) Defense Acquisition Regulations (DAR)
(e) DoD Directive 7045.13, "DoD Credit Management and Debt Collection Program,"
July 8, 1982
(f) DoD 7220. 9-H, "Accounting Guidance Handbook," February 1, 1978,
authorized by DoD Instruction 7220.9, October 22, 1981
(g) DoD Directive 5000.19, "Policies for the Management and Control of Infor-
mation Requirements," March 12, 1976







A. Closed Audit Report . An audit report that has been dispositioned.
B. Contract Audit Report . The contract auditor's written advice to a con-
tracting officer advocating' specif ic action on the part of the contracting
officer or contractor. An audit report could include amounts questioned or
disapproved, exceptions to a contractor's system or operations, usually
expressed in terms of cost avoidance, or notification of a contractor's non-
compliance with cost accounting standards. Any cost set aside as "unsupported"
or "unresolved" will not be considered as a recommendation.
C. Costs Questioned Sustained . That portion of costs questioned by the
auditor that is upheld as a result of actions taken by either the contractor
or the contracting officer.
D. Disposition of Contract Audit Reports . Contract audit report disposition
is achieved when (1) the contractor implements the audit recommendations; or
(2) the contracting officer negotiates a settlement with the contractor; or
(3) the contracting officer makes a unilateral decision; or (4) a decision has
been rendered on an appeal made to the Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals
(ASBCA) or U.S. Claims Court; and (5) all corrective actions deemed necessary by
the contracting officer have been taken and no further actions can be reasonably
anticipated.
E. Litigation . Aa audit report is in litigation any time an appeal has been
filed with the ASBCA or any court concerning an audit recommendation.
F. Open Audit Report . An audit report that has not been dispositioned.
G. Overaged . Aa audit report that has not been dispositioned and is over 6
months old (.from date of issuance) on the "as of" date of the status report.
H. Resolution . The point at which the audit organization and the contracting
officer agree on the action to be taken on audit report recommendations; or,
in the event of disagreement, when the matters are elevated for review by the
DISAO and its recommendations have been considered by the contracting officer







A. The reports shall provide the information detailed in paragraph E.3.b.,
basic Directive. All listed reports shall be tracked and reported through
final disposition.
B. Each acquisition and contract administration senior management official
shall submit a semiannual status report in the attached format. Summary
reports for DoD Components shall be submitted to the IG. The reports shall
cover the semiannual periods ending March 31 and September 30 and shall be
submitted within 30 calendar days after the end of the period. Items shall
be removed from the tracking and reporting system in the period following that
in which they appeared on the status report as being closed. The first semi-
annual report shall cover the period ending September 30, 1983.
Attachments - 2
1. Status Report on Specified Contract Audit Reports—Open Reports


























CONTRACT AUDIT REPORTS SUBJECT TO TRACKING,
REPORTING, RESOLUTION, AND NOTIFICATION REQUIREMENTS
A. Reports Subject to Tracking
All contract audit reports (for preaward contract audits, tracking may be
accomplished using records maintained in official contract files).
B. Reports Subject to Tracking and Reporting Requirements of Subsections E.2.
and E.3., Basic Directive :
1. All reports with audit recommendations:
a. Estimating system surveys
b. Accounting system reviews
c. Internal control reviews
d. Defective pricing reviews
e. Cost accounting standards noncompliance reviews
f. Operations audits
2. Reports with recommendations and costs questioned of $50,000 or more:
a. Incurred costs
b. Settlement of indirect cost rates
c. Final pricing submissions
d. Termination settlement proposals
e. Equitable adjustment claims
f. Hardship claims
g. Escalation claims
C. Reports Subject to Resolution of Differences
All contract audit reports.
D. Reports Subject to Resolution and Notification Requirements of Subsections
E.4. and E.5., 3asic Directive :
1. All reports with audit recommendations:
a. Estimating system surveys
b. Accounting system reviews
c. Internal control reviews
d. Defective pricing reviews
e. Cost accounting standards noncompliance reviews
f. Operations audits
2. Reports with recommendations and costs questioned of $50,000 or more
and with unresolved differences between the auditor and contracting officer




•b. Settlement of indirect cost rates
c. Final pricing submissions
d. Termination settlement proposals
e. Equitable adjustment claims
f. Hardship claims
g. Escalation claims
3. Reports with recommendations on proposals and costs questioned of
$500,000 or more or on rate proposals with a pricing impact equal to at least
$500,000 and with unresolved differences between the auditor and contracting
officer that total at least 5 percent of total costs questioned:
a. Forward pricing







^&£^§*£ Department of Defense Directive
ATSD(RiO)





DoD Directive 5000. 41, "Policies for Follow-up
on Audit and Internal Review Reports," January 16,
1981
0MB Circular A-73, "Audit of Federal Operations and
Programs"
Defense Acquisition Regulations (DAR)
DoD 7220. 9-H, "Accounting Guidance Handbook,"
February 1, 1978, authorized by DoD Instruction
7220.9, "Guidance for Accounting and Reporting for
Appropriations and Related Programs and Budgets,"
July 12, 1971
A. PURPOSE
1. This Directive prescribes follow-up policies for management
action on contract audit recommendations made by the Defense Contract
Audit Agency (DCAA) . The DoD general policy on audit follow-up,
contained in reference (a), recognized the need for special guidance
for follow-up on contract audit recommendations to accommodate the
differences between such audits and audits or reviews performed by
internal auditors. This Directive provides that guidance.
2. This Directive implements reference (b) by establishing a
system. for follow-up on qontract audit recommendations. The
system provides for (a) tracking and reporting significant contract
audit reports and recommendations; (b) a procedure to resolve
differences on the disposition of significant contract audit re-
commendations; and (c) an evaluation of the effectiveness of the
DoD Components' follow-up systems.
B. APPLICABILITY
The provisions in this Directive apply to the Office of the
Secretary of Defense, the Military Departments, the Organization
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Defense Agencies (herein
referred to as "DoD Components"). The term "Military Services,"





Terms used in this Directive are defined in enclosure 1.
D. POLICY
1. General . Contracting officers and other acquisition management offi-
cials shall pursue timely resolution of contract audit recommendations. The
contract audit follow-up system shall be structured in consonance with the
independent decision-making role of the contracting officer and the financial
advisory role of the contract auditor.
2. Tracking and Reporting Requirements on Contract Audit Recommendations .
DoD acquisition organizations will track and report on all significant contract
audit recommendations involving actions such as incurred costs, settlement of
indirect cost rates, termination settlement proposals, claims proposals, progress
payment requests, final pricing or closing of a contract, estimating systems
surveys, accounting system and internal control reviews, defective pricings,
noncompliance with cost accountings standards, operations audits and contract
modifications. Status reports shall be prepared for all tracked recommenda-
tions that remain open for more than 6 months after the audit report date.
Except for estimating system si'rveys, other audit recommendations involving
•original placement of contracts will not be included in the status report cr
the tracking system required by this Directive.
3. Management Oversight of the Disposition of Contract Audit Recommenda-
tions . DoD policy requires resolution of differences between the contracting
officer and the contract auditor on settlement of all significant contract
audit recommendations.
a. Each DoD Component shall designate an independent senior acquisi-
tion official at each appropriate organizational level who will review any
such. differences before final settlement. Each DoD Component shall also
designate an independent senior acquisition official to review the con-
tracting of ficer ' s' prenegotiation objective in connection with all negotiated
contract actions where the pricing proposal is at least $500,000 and signifi-
cant audit recommendations have not been resolved by agreement between the
auditor and the contracting officer.
b. Existing acquisition review boards or panels, at appropriate organiza-
tional levels, may be designated to perform both functions. The official will
receive for review, along with other technical materials, the contract auditor's
report. The official shall give careful consideration to all significant
recommendations of the auditors, as well as the recommendations rendered by
the other members of the contracting officer's team, in evaluating the negoti-
ating objectives proposed by tbe contracting officer. The official shall
provide a written report to the contracting officer, and shall take a clear





A. Early Resolution of Differences of Opinion on Contract Audit Recom-
mendations . From the time of audit report issuance to the time of U.nal
resolution of the audit recommendations, there shall be continuous communica-
tion between the auditor and the contracting officer. Differences of opinion
on the proposed disposition of significant audit recommendations shall be
brought promptly to the attention of the designated official, review board, or
panel for early review.
5. Notification of Final Disposition of Contract Audit Report . Any
follow-up system requires adequate feedback to the auditor on the final disposi-
tion of audit recommendations. Therefore, the contracting officer shall
prepare a memorandum covering the disposition of all audit report recommenda-
tions, and the underlying rationale for such disposition. A copy will be
provided to the cognizant contract auditor and the independent senior acquisi-
tion official or board. All such memoranda shall specifically state whether or
not the contracting officer requested a review and shall explicitly delineate
every instance in which the contracting officer has taken an action different
from that recommended by the independent senior acquisition official. Existing
reports such as a price negotiation memorandum (DAR 3-81 1(a), reference (c))
or a written overhead negotiation memorandum (DAR 3-705(b)(5), reference (c))
may be used, when applicable. For all other actions a similar document should
be prepared. To ensure that the disposition of all audit reports is properly
accounted for, each DoD Component must notify the cognizant audit office in
writing of cancellations of any acquistion action and of any unsuccessful
offerors not receiving award of a contract or grant for which an audit report
was issued.
6. Recovery of Funds . DoD Components shall initiate prompt action to
collect contract debts. Policies and procedures governing the collection of
contract debts are contained in Appendix E of the DAR (reference (c)). Poli-
cies and procedures to account for contract debts are contained in DoD 7220. 9-H
(reference (d)), and in subsection D.6., DoD Directive 5000.41, (reference (a)),
regarding the establishment of accounts receivable when management agrees with
the auditors that resources should be recovered.
7. Coordination with Other Agencies . The cognizant contracting office
responsible for acting on contract audit recommendations that affect contracts
of other government organizations will have procedures to inform affected
organizations of such actions.
E. RESPONSIBILITIES
1. The Secretaries of the Military Departments and the Directors of
the Defense Agencies shall:
a. Designate a senior management official to serve as a focal point
for the audit follow-up function. The designated official shall be responsi-
ble for establishing the DoD Component's follow-up procedures for contract
audits, and for the system's overall operation and reporting requirements.
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b. Designate independent senior acquisition officials, boards, or
panels within the DoD Component's procurement and contract administration
functions who shall review those cases where the contracting officer's pro-
posed disposition of significant contract audit recommendations differs sub-
stantially from the contract auaitor's report recommendations. These offi-
cials, boards, or panels shall have sufficient independence to conduct an
impartial review of the issues brought before them, and in accordance with
procedures in subsection D.3. of this Directive, shall provide to the contracting
officer objective written reports on the issues involved.
c. Ensure that periodic evaluations of DoD Component follow-up sys-
tems are performed to determine that the system is adequate and results in
timely and appropriate disposition of the audit recommendations. The Military
Departments will have their internal audit agencies perform these reviews.
The Defense Audit Service will review the Defense Agencies' follow-up systems.
2. The Follow-up Focal Point for each DoD Component shall:
a. Establish procedures for the maintenance of formal records on all
applicable contract audit reports issued by the DCAA covered in the procedures
in enclosure 2.
b. Establish procedures to monitor the disposition of contract audit
recommendations to ensure that appropriate actions are initiated and completed.
c. Prepare the DoD Component's semiannual status report and submit it
to the Office of the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense (Review and Over-
sight) (OATSD(R&0) ) in accordance with the procedures in section F. of this
Directive.
3. The DoD Components' Designated Independent Senior Acquisition Official
or Boards shall establish procedures for resolving disagreements on the action
•taken on all significant contract audit recommendations. These procedures
shall comply with the following criteria:
a. The designated independent senior acquisition official or board
shall review the contracting officer's proposed disposition of every signifi-
cant' contract audit recommendation when that contracting officer intends to
resolve the issue in a manner substantially different from the contract auditor's
reported recommendation.
b. Such reviews shall be initiated by the cognizant contracting
officer. The contracting officer's written statement on a proposed dispos-
ition of the significant audit recommendation shall be forwarded for review to
the designated official or board. The reviewing official or board may request
that DCAA provide additional input. The reviewing official or board shall
make a specific recommendation on each audit finding received, and provide a






c. The reviewing official or board shall also consider disagreements
wheo the review is requested by the DCAA. Such requests would occur in cases
where the negotiation memorandum indicates that there is a substantial differ-
ence of opinion on the settlement of a significant audit recommendation, and
the contracting offirer did not request a review by the designated official or
board. The reviewing official or board shall obtain from the contracting
officer the reasons for not complying with the provisions of subsections D.3,
E.3., and A. In addition, the reviewing officals shall provide a written
statement to the contracting officer, the contracting officer's supervisor,
and the auditor on the propriety of the audit recommendation and the disposi-
tion accorded the recommendation by the contracting officer.
d. When the reviewing official or board identifies a need for addi-
tional or revised guidance, or changes in policy or regulatory requirements,
details shall be forwarded to the appropriate office with suggestions for the
change or additional guidance needed.
4. DoD Managers of Individual DoD Procurement or Contract Administration
Offices shall:
a. Take prompt action to resolve all contract audit recommendations
in accordance with acquisition guidelines and the requirements of this Directive.
b. Maintain and provide information required in conjunction with
followup status reporting procedures.
c. Ensure the forwarding of required information to the designated
review official or board responsible for reviewing the disposition of signifi-
cant contract audit recommendations.
5- Heads of the Cognizant DoD Internal Audit Organizations shall:
a. 3e responsible for internal reviews to determine if the DoD Com-
ponents' follow-up systems on contract audit recommendations are adequate and
result in timely and appropriate disposition of audit recommendations.
b. Complete the first evaluation of the system within 1 year of the
system's implementation and perform evaluations every 2 years thereafter.
6. The Director of the Defense Contract Audit Agency shall:
a. Provide timely and complete support to any reviewing official or
board's request for factual information or audit opinions regarding the audit
recommendations under review.
b. Monitor all negotiation' memoranda received. In cases where the
negotiation memorandum indicates there is a substantial difference of opinion
on the settlement of a significant audit recommendation, and the contracting
officer did not request a review by the designated official or board, the DCAA
shall request a review of the issue by the reviewing official or board. A
record will be maintained of these instances and will be available to the





c. Maintain in its management information system a record, including
pertinent dollar amounts, of all instances reported by the contracting officer
where the action taken has been different from that recommended by an indepen-
dent acquisition official or review board.
d. Provide timely and complete support to any internal audit organ-
ization reviewing a DoD Component's contract audit follow-up system.
F. INFORMATION REQUIREMENTS
Follow-up status reports (enclosure 2) for semiannual periods ending March
31 and September 30 shall be submitted to the OATSD(R&0) within 30 calendar
days after the end of the period. The reporting requirements of this Directive
have been assigned Report Control Symbol DD-RSO(SA) 1580. The status reports will
provide an aged list of audit reports involving those items stipulated in sub-
section D.2. that have been open for more than 6 months, together with a pro-
jected target date for disposition. All listed items will be tracked until
final disposition.
G. EFFECTIVE DATE AND IMPLEMENTATION
This Directive is effective immediately. Forward one copy of implementing
documents to the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense (Review and Oversight)
within 30 days. Follow-up systems shall be fully operational by September 30,
1981, and the first required semiannual report shall be prepared for the
period ending March 31, 1982.
^S Frank C. Carlucci
Deputy Secretary of Defense
Enclosures - 2
1. Definitions






A. Contract Audit Recommendation . The contract auditor's written advice
published in a formal contract audit report advocating specific action on the
part of the contracting officer. This includes amounts questioned or disap-
proved, exceptions to a contractor's sytcm, operations expressed in terms of
cost avoidance, or a contractor's noncompliance with Cost Accounting Standards.
B. Significant Recommendation . (1) Any recommendation made on a negotiated
contract action where the pricing proposal is at least $500,000; (2) for
audits other than those of pricing proposals, any report that has a potential
financial effect of at least $500,000 without regard to its impact on an
individual contract; or (3) aoy recommendation involving improper practices
regardless of dollar amount; or (A) any recommendation, regardless of dollar
amount, which, in the judgment of officials, involves an issue that may have a
significant impact on acquisition procedures or policy. Other thresholds may
be used by DoD Components, on an exception basis, when justified in light of
special circumstances and only with the written approval of the ATSD(RSO)
.
Any recommendation having continuing impact at a particular contractor loca-
tion, or that may affect other contractors, may be considered significant.
C. Disposition of Contract Audit Recommendation . Disposition is achieved
when (1) the contractor implements the audit recommendation; (2) the con-
tracting officer completes action after receiving and considering the report
of the designated official, board, or panel; (3) the auditor agrees with the
contracting officer or withdraws the audit recommendation; (A) a decision has
been rendered on an appeal made to the Armed Services Board of Contracts
Appeals or Court of Claims.
D. Contracting. Officer . The procuring contracting officer, administrative
contracting officer or termination contracting officer, as appropriate, when
that individual is responsible for dealing with matters that are the subject





( Enc i 2 )
FOLLOW-UP STATUS REPORTS
A. GENERAL. Each acquisition and contract administration focal point shall
prepare a semiannual status report in the format shown in attachment 1. The
reports shall be submitted to the head of the DoD Component and to the Com-
ponent's internal audit agency. Summary reports for the DoD Components shall
be submitted to the OATSD(RSO). The reports will cover the semiannual periods
ending March 31 and September 30 and shall be submitted within 30 calendar
days after the end of the period. The first semiannual report will cover the
period ended March 31, 1982.
B. PREPARATION
1. Each DoD Component shall establish procedures to account for and track
all significant audit reports and recommendations, as described in subsection
D.2., received by the DoD Component. A schedule, listing these audit reports
shall be maintained by each DoD Component and shall serve as the source docu-
ment for the semiannual follow-up status report. This record will track each
audit recommendation until its disposition.
2. The follow-up status report will show all significant overaged contract
audit reports. All identified contract audit reports will be considered
overage 6 months after issuance of the contract audit report containing the
significant recommendation. An estimated target date must be provided for
resolution of the reports not completed by the end of the reporting period.
3. All items reported as open for more than 6 months will be tracked on
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